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When compared with other constitutional doctrines, Establishment Clause
doctrine is confused and anomalous, both substantively and with regard to standing.
The Supreme Court ought to craft reforms in light of a wide-angle appraisal of
pertinent comparisons, analogies, and interconnections. Substantively, the Justices
should adopt the tiers-of-scrutiny approach that the Court employs under the Free
Exercise, Free Speech, and Equal Protection Clauses. Within a tiered-scrutiny
regime, the Court should strictly scrutinize any statute that classifies or requires
classifications based on religion. It should prescribe intermediate scrutiny for statutes
that expend tax revenues to provide material benefits to churches or religiously
affiliated organizations on a nondiscriminatory, nonpreferential basis. And it should
clarify its approach to determining which symbolic supports for religion rise to the
level of Establishment Clause violations. Correspondingly, the Court should realign
standing doctrine to equate the injuries needed for standing more closely with those
against which the Establishment Clause furnishes substantive protection.
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INTRODUCTION
Establishment Clause doctrine is notoriously confused and disarrayed—
“a farrago of unstable rules, tests, standards, principles, and exceptions” that
“leaves constitutional law scholars reminiscing wistfully about the elegance
and simplicity of the Uniform Commercial Code or the Rule Against
Perpetuities.”1 Establishment Clause doctrine is also anomalous as compared
with the rule structure that prevails in analogous areas of constitutional law.
In this Article, I argue that consideration of two central anomalies, and of
some of the confusions that surround them, will illumine a path to attractive,
rationalizing, clarifying reforms.
First, unlike many other doctrines that protect individual rights, the
Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause cases do not employ an analytically
sequenced, tiered framework for judicial review of the kind that the Court
uses to enforce the Free Speech, Free Exercise, Equal Protection, and Due
1

PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE 223 (2011).
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Process Clauses, for example.2 In tiered-scrutiny regimes, a court asks first
whether a challenger has alleged a violation of a right or interest to which a
particular constitutional provision plausibly extends protection.3 If not, the
court dismisses any constitutional challenges without further analysis. If a
case plausibly comes within a provision’s protective ambit, however, the court
applies a more or less elevated level of scrutiny, depending on the violation
alleged.4 In cases involving direct infringements of fundamental rights or
interests, either strict or intermediate scrutiny—as distinguished from
rational basis review—normally applies. Admittedly, the Supreme Court has
blurred the lines between its traditional tiers of review in some recent cases,
especially involving gay rights.5 Nevertheless, analytically sequenced, tiered
review defines the norm in important swathes of constitutional law.
Establishment Clause cases disdain this approach. In the words of leading
commentators, “long-standing Establishment Clause methodology” dictates
that “[o]nce a practice . . . is judicially determined to be an establishment of
religion . . . [c]ompeting government interests play no part.”6 Instead, the
Supreme Court has often held that statutes that were adopted either
exclusively or predominantly for the forbidden purpose of promoting
religion, or that have the principal or primary effect of doing so, are per se

2 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. R EV . 1267, 1268-69 (2007)
(documenting the Supreme Court’s reliance on a strict scrutiny test to identify constitutional
violations under these and other provisions).
3 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration
of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769-74 (2004) (distinguishing between the
“coverage” of the First Amendment and the protection that it ultimately affords or does not afford
following the application of a First Amendment test).
4 See, e.g., R ICHARD H. FALLON , J R ., I MPLEMENTING THE C ONSTITUTION 87-89 (2001)
(discussing suspect- and non-suspect-content tests); Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate
Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 786-87
(explaining the role of tiers of review in Free Speech Clause doctrine); Suzanne B. Goldberg,
Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 494-503 (2004) (examining the development of
suspect-classification analysis under the Equal Protection Clause).
5 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (holding that the Defense of
Marriage Act violated the Fifth Amendment without specifying the level of scrutiny applied);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003) (invalidating an anti-sodomy ordinance under the Due
Process Clause without invoking strict scrutiny); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (holding
that a Colorado constitutional amendment that barred anti-discrimination protections for gays and
lesbians failed to meet even the rational basis test).
6 Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 20 LEWIS & C LARK L. REV. 1265, 1276-77 (2017);
see also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012)
(“The interest of society in the enforcement of employment discrimination statutes is undoubtedly
important. But so too is the interest of religious groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs,
teach their faith, and carry out their mission. When a minister who has been fired sues her church
alleging that her termination was discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance for
us. The church must be free to choose those who will guide it on its way.”).
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invalid.7 Yet the Court has not applied that test—which is often associated
with Lemon v. Kurtzman8—consistently. Some leading cases have reached
results that would be hard if not impossible to justify if the Court applied
Lemon’s stated prohibitions categorically.9
In cases involving the permissibility of statutes that lift burdens on
religious institutions and religiously motivated individuals, the Court has said
that no Establishment Clause violation occurs if the government responds to
severe, governmentally imposed hardships and “take[s] adequate account of
the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries.”10
This formulation may hint that the government must closely tailor any
religiously-based preferences to the promotion of governmental interests of
some kind, but does not say so expressly. Moreover, tailoring analysis is
wholly absent in most Establishment Clause cases, including both those that
uphold and those that reject constitutional challenges. As if befuddled about
how to rationalize the existing pattern of results, the Court has sometimes
rejected Establishment Clause challenges without clear reliance on any
doctrinal formula whatsoever.11
The introduction of a regime of analytically sequenced, tiered scrutiny
would help impose both clarity and rational order on the currently chaotic
Establishment Clause landscape. No linguistic or historical logic dictates that
all constitutional doctrines should have the same structure. But the attractions
of analytically sequenced, tiered scrutiny are familiar and intuitive.12
Consider a hypothetical case in which a state legislature long ago adopted the
7 See, e.g., McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 850 (2005) (affirming that
“a determination of the counties’ [forbidden] purpose is a sound basis” for finding an Establishment
Clause violation); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987) (“[A]ppellants have identified no
clear secular purpose for the Louisiana Act.”); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (striking
down the statute at issue since it “had no secular purpose” (emphasis in original)).
8 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). See infra note 104 and accompanying text (quoting the Lemon test).
9 See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1828 (2014) (upholding a town’s practice
of beginning official meetings with a public prayer); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)
(ruling that a town’s display of a crèche did not violate the Establishment Clause).
10 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005).
11 See, e.g., Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1819 (“Marsh stands for the proposition that it is not
necessary to define the precise boundary of the Establishment Clause where history shows that the
specific practice is permitted. Any test the Court adopts must acknowledge a practice that was
accepted by the Framers and has withstood the critical scrutiny of time and political change.”);
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (plurality opinion) (“Whatever may be the fate of the
Lemon test in the larger scheme of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we think it not useful in
dealing with the sort of passive monument that Texas has erected on its Capitol grounds. Instead,
our analysis is driven both by the nature of the monument and by our Nation’s history.”).
12 See Fallon, supra note 2, at 1292-93 (discussing the attractions of strict judicial scrutiny);
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing,
63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 295-96 (1992) (describing the role of tiers of review in efforts to promote
judicial restraint).
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state statute prohibiting murder for the sole purpose—in the psychological
sense of that term—of enforcing one of God’s commandments. To hold such
a statute per se invalid because of the legislature’s forbidden intent would
seem draconian and untenable. Many of us would have a similar reaction if
local authorities required the vaccination of school children solely for the
forbidden purpose of discouraging Christian Scientists from moving into a
community, but it later became apparent that requiring vaccinations served
vital public health interests. For those who share these intuitions, a typical
response, informed by other constitutional doctrines, would postulate that the
hypothesized statutes should incur strict judicial scrutiny, but that they should
survive if sufficiently narrowly tailored to compelling governmental interests.13
A real, topical example further illustrates the anomalous character of the
Supreme Court’s failure to apply analytically sequenced, tiered judicial
scrutiny under the Establishment Clause. Statutes that exempt religious
institutions or religiously motivated individuals from otherwise generally
applicable laws require religiously-based classifications in order to sort those
who qualify for exemptions from those who do not. If challenged under the
Equal Protection Clause, classifications based on religion, the Court has
sometimes asserted, would be assimilated to those based on race.14 And racebased classifications trigger strict judicial scrutiny.15 The Court has also
prescribed strict scrutiny for religiously-based classifications under the Free
Exercise Clause, at least when they are used to exclude some from benefits

13 This conclusion represents an application of the broader thesis that statutes should never be
deemed per se impermissible based solely on legislative intentions in the psychological sense. See
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 523, 558 (2016).
14 See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464-65 (1996) (“[T]he decision whether
to prosecute may not be based on ‘an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary
classification.’” (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962))); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,
911 (1995) (“At the heart of the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command
that the Government must treat citizens ‘as individuals, not “as simply components of a racial,
religious, sexual or national class.”’” (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990)));
Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 651 (1992) (identifying classifications drawn along
“lines like race or religion” as “suspect”); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)
(characterizing “distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage” as “suspect”).
15 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016) (‘“[B]ecause racial
characteristics so seldom provide a relevant basis for disparate treatment,”’ ‘“[r]ace may not be
considered [by a university] unless the admissions process can withstand strict scrutiny.”’ (citations
omitted)); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (“We have held that ‘all racial
classifications [imposed by government] . . . must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict
scrutiny.’” (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995))). In Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, after having
determined that the exclusion of a church from eligibility for participation in a state funding
program solely because of its status as a church failed strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause,
the Court determined that it “need not reach the Church’s claim that the policy also violates the
Equal Protection Clause.” 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024 n.5 (2017).
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available to others based on their religious status.16 If classifications based on
religion are suspect under the Equal Protection and Free Exercise Clauses,
why, one wonders, should they escape strict judicial scrutiny in Establishment
Clause cases?17 A possible response would be that the Court regards many
statutory accommodations for religious practitioners as benign, even
desirable, and believes that they should be upheld if they do not impose
excessive burdens on third parties. But in cases involving other classifications
drawn along “suspect” lines, including those involving race-based affirmative
action in higher education, that conclusion would need to emerge from a strict
scrutiny framework.18 A disposition to favor otherwise suspect line-drawing
in a particular context would not furnish a justification for forgoing searching
analysis.
Adoption of an analytically sequenced, tiered-scrutiny approach would
also invite a rationalizing reconceptualization of the relationship among some
prominent subcategories within Establishment Clause doctrine that now
appear more dissonant than harmonious. One important strain of decisions
involves material support for religious institutions or activities.19 In this
branch of Establishment Clause doctrine, leading cases have demanded
16 See id. at 2019 (“[L]aws that target the religious for ‘special disabilities’ based on their
‘religious status’” trigger strict judicial scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause. (quoting Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533, 542 (1993))); Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 886 n.3 (1990) (“[W]e strictly scrutinize governmental classifications based on religion.”). In
Locke v. Davey, the Supreme Court applied only rational basis review in adjudicating an equal
protection challenge to a state scholarship program that denied funding for studies designed to
induce religious faith. 540 U.S. 712, 720 n.3 (2004). The Court reasoned that because “the program
is not a violation of the Free Exercise Clause, . . . we apply rational-basis scrutiny to his equal
protection claims.” Id. But Locke did not involve a classification based on religious status per se, as
the Court recently emphasized. See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2016 (“Davey was not denied a
scholarship because of who he was; he was denied a scholarship because of what he proposed to do—
use the funds to prepare for the ministry. Here there is no question that Trinity Lutheran was denied
a grant simply because of what it is—a church.” (emphasis in original)).
17 So far no clear test of permissibility has emerged under the Establishment Clause, especially
insofar as accommodations for one person result in heightened burdens on another. See Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005) (discussing that “courts must take adequate account of the
burdens” that may be imposed on nonbeneficiaries); Kent Greenawalt, Establishment Clause Limits
on Free Exercise Accommodations, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 343, 343 (2007) (“[T]he Supreme Court has
given us no theory, or no tenable theory, for drawing the line between permissible accommodation
and impermissible establishment.”). Carl H. Esbeck purports to discern “ten Black Letter Rules that
fairly restate the cases.” Carl H. Esbeck, When Accommodations for Religion Violate the Establishment
Clause: Regularizing the Supreme Court’s Analysis, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 359, 371 (2007). But even his
portrait is one of complexity and, I would say, consequent indeterminacy.
18 See, e.g., Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2214-15 (upholding an affirmative action program as narrowly tailored
to a compelling governmental interest); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326, 334 (2003) (same).
19 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 835-36 (2000) (holding that it did not violate the
First Amendment for a state to provide educational materials for use by religious as well as secular
schools); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 667-74 (1970) (upholding property tax exemptions for
religious institutions along with other nonprofit organizations).
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governmental neutrality,20 both among religions and between religious and
nonreligious beneficiaries.21 Their categorical formulations suggest that any
preferences for or among religious institutions or adherents of different faiths
would violate the Establishment Clause.
In a second set of cases, however, demands for neutrality vanish, as the
Supreme Court sometimes tolerates the singling out of religious institutions
and religious believers for exemptions from otherwise applicable regulatory
burdens,22 including those of complying with antidiscrimination laws.23
More confusion enters the picture when one looks at cases involving
symbolic support for religion. Representative examples arise when the
government sponsors prayers24 or maintains displays with religious elements,
such as the Ten Commandments.25 Sometimes the Supreme Court has

20 The term “neutrality” is admittedly a vexed one. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 15-45 (2013) (cataloguing various senses of the term
“neutrality” as used throughout American history); Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and
Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 D EP AUL L. REV. 993, 999-1011 (1990) (differentiating
among different possible senses of “neutrality”). In Professor Laycock’s terms:

A law is formally neutral if it does not use religion as a category—if religious and
secular examples of the same phenomenon are treated exactly the same. Substantive
neutrality requires neutral incentives. A law is substantively neutral if it neither
encourages [n]or discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice,
observance or nonobservance.
Douglas Laycock, Substantive Neutrality Revisited, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 51, 54 (2007) (internal
quotation and citation omitted). The Supreme Court predominantly uses the term in a formal sense
to refer to statutes and programs that do not explicitly distinguish between or among religious and
nonreligious people, activities, or organizations in imposing burdens or distributing benefits. Unless
the context indicates otherwise, I use the term “neutrality” in this admittedly contestable formal sense.
21 See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (plurality opinion) (affirming
that “government may not be overtly hostile to religion” nor “place its prestige, coercive authority,
or resources behind a single religious faith or behind religious belief in general”). Even cases that
uphold neutral distributions strongly suggest that neutrality is a necessary predicate for their
rulings. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002) (explaining the focus “on
neutrality and the principle of private choice” in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1
(1993)); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 802, 830 (2000) (emphasizing that “[t]he program makes
a broad array of schools eligible for aid without regard to their religious affiliations or lack thereof ”).
22 See, e.g., Cutter, 544 U.S. at 719-26 (upholding a challenged exemption mandate of the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1987) (holding that
an exemption provided to the secular nonprofit activities of a religious organization did not violate
the Establishment Clause).
23 See generally Corp. of the Presiding Bishop, 483 U.S. 327.
24 See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1828 (2014) (permitting prayers at town
meetings); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983) (permitting the Nebraska Legislature’s
practice of opening with a prayer).
25 See, e.g., McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S.
677, 692 (2005); County. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 620 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
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invalidated such practices.26 Sometimes, however, it upholds them.27 In cases
of this third, symbolic kind, the Supreme Court cannot credibly require strict
governmental neutrality toward religion—at least unless or until it is
prepared to forbid symbolic support for religion altogether.28 Even so, it
sometimes applies the Lemon test and says that any statute with the
predominant purpose or effect of promoting religion violates the
Establishment Clause29—even though it takes formidable machinations to
conclude that this test would not forbid all symbolic support for religion,
including such seemingly untouchable practices as the engraving of “In God
We Trust” on the currency.30 When focused on this set of problems, some of
the Justices have sometimes maintained that the government violates the
Establishment Clause only when it engages in coercion or sustained, one-sect
proselytization.31 But this conclusion fits uneasily with cases involving the
provision of material benefits to religious institutions and activities, some of
which appear to imply that any form of non-neutral, preferential treatment
would violate the Establishment Clause, often without specific reference to
whether coercion or one-sect proselytization occurs.32
A fourth strand of cases, cleaved off from the third, comprises challenges
to religious teaching and practice in the public schools. Cases involving school
prayer illustrate the distinction. In Town of Greece v. Galloway, the Supreme
Court, by 5 to 4, upheld a town’s practice of beginning official meetings with
a public prayer.33 By contrast, the Court, since the 1960s, has adhered to the
view that the Constitution prohibits any officially sponsored prayer in the
public schools.34
Much if not all of the tension among these strands of cases would
dissolve if the Supreme Court integrated them into an analytically
26 See, e.g., McCreary Cty., 545 U.S at 881 (affirming the preliminary injunction against the
display of the Ten Commandments); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (declaring a public
school’s practice of including prayers as part of the graduation ceremony unconstitutional).
27 See, e.g., Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 692 (permitting display of a Ten Commandments monument
on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795.
28 For the view that the Establishment Clause categorically bars the government from taking
stands on matters of religious truth in any context, see HORWITZ , supra note 1, at 256-62. But even
Professor Horwitz acknowledges that judges who refuse rigorously to enforce the principle that he
espouses “may be right” in light of what he calls “the constitutional easement mess” that arises from
longstanding violations of that principle and the adverse practical consequences that might ensue
from judicial efforts to uproot long-ensconced and honored traditions. Id. at 262, 266.
29 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
30 For discussion, see infra note 103 and accompanying text.
31 See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
32 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
33 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1828 (2014).
34 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (“We think that by using its public school system
to encourage recitation of the Regents’ prayer, the State of New York has adopted a practice wholly
inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.”).
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sequenced, tiered-scrutiny framework. Within such a regime, strict scrutiny,
intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review would supplant the ultimate
tests of constitutional validity that the Court has articulated within the
various categories that I just distinguished. Yet the categories and the
principles that the Court has established in constructing them would retain
the important function of defining diverse rights or interests that the
Establishment Clause presumptively protects, any infringement of which
would trigger judicial scrutiny of a specified level. To be slightly more
concrete, within an analytically sequenced, tiered-scrutiny regime, there
would be different triggers for the application of elevated scrutiny in cases
respectively involving governmental expenditures to support religion,
exemptions of religiously motivated conduct from otherwise applicable
duties, symbolic support for religion, and religion in the public schools. For
example, we could recognize that the Establishment Clause creates a
presumptively protected right or interest in not having tax dollars expended
on a non-neutral basis to support religious activities, but that it does not
generate a comparable, presumptively protected right to government
neutrality with respect to matters of symbolic support. We could also
recognize, as we should, that the Establishment Clause creates presumptive
rights not to be classified on the basis of religion for purposes of determining
one’s statutory obligations or entitlements to benefits.
Overall, an analytically sequenced, tiered-scrutiny doctrinal structure
would encourage recognition and embrace of the multifarious values that the
Establishment Clause protects. At the same time, it would force
acknowledgment that sufficiently important governmental interests might
sometimes justify infringements of presumptively protected rights—for
example, if the government has a compelling interest in employing religious
classifications to exempt believers from generally applicable laws in order to
facilitate their free exercise of religion in some ways or under some
circumstances.35 To expect that all Establishment Clause issues and problems
could be governed by a few elegant substantive principles that would cut
across the categories that I outlined above is procrustean if not delusional.
The second major anomaly in Establishment Clause doctrine involves
standing. The Establishment Clause has generated a unique body of standing
law that, ironically, is often misaligned with reigning substantive principles.36
35
36

For an argument to this effect, see infra notes 227–251 and accompanying text.
To date, the interconnections between standing and merits tests have drawn less scholarly
attention than one might expect, but have not been wholly ignored. For discussions of standing in
the context of the Establishment Clause, see Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural
Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 I OWA L. REV. 1, 34-35 (1998) (“Of interest here is the Court’s
general refusal to grant standing in instances of structural violations that result in no ‘injury in
fact.’”); Richard W. Garnett, Standing, Spending, and Separation: How the No-Establishment Rule Does
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Under other constitutional provisions, the Supreme Court has held that
taxpayers have no standing to complain about allegedly unconstitutional
taxing and spending programs.37 In Flast v. Cohen, the Court carved out an
exception for taxpayer standing to challenge governmental spending under
the Establishment Clause.38 Nearly fifty years later, Flast remains a doctrinal
lynchpin. But the Court has sharply limited its reach, without explaining
clearly how standing determinations relate to substantive analysis of the
rights and interests that the Establishment Clause protects.39 In an effort to
bring Establishment Clause standing more nearly into line with general
standing principles, the Court ruled in Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc. that “the psychological
consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one
disagrees . . . is not an injury sufficient to confer standing under Art. III, even
though the disagreement is phrased in constitutional terms.”40
The misalignment between merits and standing doctrine emerges when
one presses the question of how the Supreme Court could have thought
standing justified in a number of its leading Establishment Clause cases,
including some in which it has found constitutional violations. Consider, for
example, cases in which it has ruled on constitutional challenges to
governmental displays of religious symbols, such as crèches and the Ten
Commandments, most frequently without any discussion of standing.41 In
(and Does Not) Protect Conscience, 54 VILL. L. REV. 655, 672 (2009) (arguing that “Flast was wrongly
decided” based on a correct understanding of the substantive values that the Establishment Clause
protects); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Ball on a Needle: Hein v. Freedom from Religion
Foundation, Inc. and the Future of Establishment Clause Adjudication, 2008 B.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 120
(2008) (“Under the broad standing doctrines that have governed for the past several decades, the
gap between substance and justiciability is relatively narrow.”); William P. Marshall & Gene R.
Nichol, Not a Winn-Win: Misconstruing Standing and the Establishment Clause, 2011 SUP. CT. REV.
215, 215 (2011) (“In no line of cases over the past half-century has the Supreme Court so directly
faced the tension between constitutional accountability and jurisdictional traditions of personal
harm as in the taxpayer standing decisions under the Establishment Clause.”); Richard C. Schragger,
The Relative Irrelevance of the Establishment Clause, 89 T EX. L. REV. 583, 599 (2011) (discussing
federal courts’ avoidance of utilizing the nonendorsement norm when considering standing under
the Establishment Clause).
37 See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 347-49 (2006) (acknowledging a “general
prohibition on taxpayer standing”).
38 392 U.S. 83, 88 (1968).
39 See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 130 (2011) (distinguishing and
refusing to extend Flast); Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 593 (2007)
(same); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 489-90 (1982) (same).
40 454 U.S. at 485-86.
41 See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1816-17 (2014) (religious invocations at
public meetings of town board); McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 851-52 (2005) (Ten
Commandments display); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005) (plurality opinion) (Ten
Commandments display); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 758, 770
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light of the straitening of taxpayer standing and the forceful rejection of standing
based on psychological harm in Valley Forge, one might puzzle about who has
suffered exactly what cognizable injury. Lower courts that have had to struggle
with such questions have exhibited division and perplexity.42 Adding to the fog,
the Supreme Court has suggested that there might be some Establishment
Clause violations that literally no one has standing to challenge.43
In order to bring substantive principles and standing doctrine under the
Establishment Clause into a rational, functionally workable equilibrium, the
Supreme Court needs to acknowledge the necessary interconnections
between merits and standing inquiries. Only confusion can come from a
failure—which both the Supreme Court and academic commentators have
often exhibited—to keep merits and standing issues simultaneously in view.44
On the surface, taxpayer standing to challenge federal and state governmental
expenditures in Establishment Clause cases may appear anomalous, because
comparable taxpayer standing does not exist under other constitutional
provisions.45 But that anomaly is more apparent than real: the only genuine
anomaly is a mismatch between substantive and standing doctrines.
Throughout constitutional law, what counts as an injury adequate to support
standing should vary with the evils that a particular provision affords

(1995) (cross erected on public property by the Ku Klux Klan); County. of Allegheny v. ACLU,
492 U.S. 573, 589-94 (1989) (crèche); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672-73 (1984) (crèche). For
a review of the standing analysis, or lack thereof, in these cases, see generally Ashley C. Robson,
Measuring a “Spiritual Stake”: How to Determine Injury-in-Fact in Challenges to Public Displays of Religion,
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2901, 2925-28 (2013).
42 See David Spencer, Note, What’s the Harm? Nontaxpayer Standing to Challenge Religious
Symbols, 34 HARV. J. L. & P UB. P OL’ Y 1071, 1082-92 (2011) (discussing the varied approaches that
lower courts have adopted).
43 See Winn, 563 U.S. at 145 (denying taxpayer standing to challenge tax credits for donations
to religious education foundations but affirming that “[i]f an establishment of religion is alleged to
cause real injury to particular individuals, the federal courts may adjudicate the matter”).
44 This thesis largely accords with the analysis of William A. Fletcher, who argues that the
question of standing is inseparable from the question of whether a particular party has a right to
enforce the duties that a particular constitutional or statutory provision creates. The Structure of
Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223-24 (1988).
45 See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 347 (2006) (citing plaintiffs’ concession
that only Establishment Clause cases have offered standing for suits brought by federal taxpayers).
The rule barring taxpayer standing to challenge expenditures applies to suits involving state and
federal taxpayers but not to municipal taxpayers challenging municipal expenditures. See Doremus
v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1952) (holding that a taxpayer can sue a municipality for
misuse of spending); Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601, 609 (1879) (“Of the right of resident taxpayers to invoke the interposition of a court of equity to prevent an illegal disposition of the moneys
of the county or the illegal creation of a debt which they in common with other property-holders of
the county may otherwise be compelled to pay, there is at this day no serious question.”); RICHARD
H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 127 & n.1 (7th ed.
2015) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] (citing Everson v. Bd. Of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)).
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protection against.46 If the Establishment Clause creates a presumptively
protected right not to be taxed to support establishments of religion, then
taxpayers should have standing to complain about expenditures of tax dollars
that benefit religious institutions or activities—even though it should be a
further question whether some or all such expenditures ultimately violate the
Clause. The same logic extends to other contexts. Across the board, the Court
should recognize that infringements of interests that the Establishment
Clause protects substantively will normally also confer standing on those
whose interests are affected most directly.
In recommending a tiered-scrutiny regime to enforce the Establishment
Clause and in calling for a realignment of standing doctrine and substantive
principles, my methodology in this Article is, loosely speaking, doctrinalist
and coherentist. I assume, though without attempting to prove, that evidence
bearing on the original meaning of the Establishment Clause is too mixed
and controverted to justify upsetting relatively settled understandings.47
46 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 T EX . L. R EV . 1061, 1070-77
(2015) [hereinafter Fallon, Fragmentation]; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability
and Remedies—and Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 690-704 (2006).
47 Some commentators believe that the historical background reflected a shared understanding
of protecting liberty of conscience, especially against governmental taxation to support religious
institutions, and argue that the modern Court has strayed far from original meanings by seeking to
enforce values of religious equality. See NOAH FELDMAN, D IVIDED BY GOD 235-49 (2005). Some
insist that a central or even the sole purpose of the Establishment Clause was to bar federal
governmental intermeddling in religion, including the state-supported churches that existed in
seven of the original states. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, T HE BILL OF RIGHTS 34 (1998);
Steven D. Smith, The Jurisdictional Establishment Clause: A Reappraisal, 81 NOTRE D AME L. REV.
1843, 1891-93 (2006) (arguing that the founders intended to leave the issue of religion in the domain
of the states). Others, however, adopt a broader view, partly in reliance on positions taken by James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson, on whom Justice Black relied in Everson. See, e.g., JOHN WITTE, JR.
& JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 97 (4th
ed. 2016) (asserting that “[r]ead in historical context” the Religion Clauses “can be seen to
‘embody’—to ‘incorporate’—multiple expressions of the essential rights and liberties of religion,”
including “religious equality” and “separation of church and state”). Further complexities and
controversies surround the issue of which Establishment Clause guarantees, if any, the Fourteenth
Amendment “incorporated” against the states. In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, Justice
Thomas, concurring in the judgment, maintained that the Establishment Clause is “a federalism
provision, which, for this reason, resists incorporation.” 542 U.S. 1, 45 (2004). Decades before, in
School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, Justice Brennan sought to refute similar arguments
by arguing that by the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification in 1868, the Establishment
Clause had emerged and could be understood as a “co-guarantor” of religious liberty along with the
Free Exercise Clause. 374 U.S. 203, 253-59 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). Professor Kurt Lash has
reached similar but not identical conclusions. See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free
Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1106, 1110,
1141-45 (1994) (discussing religious liberty in the context of military exemptions). In this Article, I
take stands on none of these historical questions, except to affirm that, in light of historical
uncertainty and subsequent practice, I do not believe that modern Establishment Clause questions
should be resolved in exclusive reliance on any reasonably disputable claim about original
constitutional meaning.
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Rather than seeking to establish foundational historical or normative
premises, I propose reforms that would better, less confusingly advance the
most important commitments that Establishment Clause jurisprudence
currently embodies. My doctrinal perspective, moreover, is insistently wideangled. It seeks to draw insights by comparing Establishment Clause with
free exercise, equal protection, and free speech doctrine.48 I employ a
similarly wide-angle approach in emphasizing connections between merits
and standing issues.49
The Article unfolds in four main parts. Part I provides an overview of
modern Establishment Clause doctrine, spanning both its merits and its
standing dimensions. Part I also identifies an ordered structure of
Establishment Clause cases and issues, but highlights conflict and disarray
within that structure. Part II lays out general arguments supporting a
tiered-scrutiny framework and a better integration of standing doctrine with
substantive doctrine. Part III applies the general reform strategy developed
in Part II to a catalogue of substantive issues under the Establishment Clause.
Part IV advances specific reform proposals with respect to standing.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF MODERN DOCTRINE, ITS ANOMALIES,
AND ITS CONFUSIONS
This Part provides an opinionated, introductory survey of Establishment
Clause doctrine. It consists in large part of a map of disorder. The anomalies and
confusions that this Part charts, involving both substantive and standing issues,
will generate and structure the reform agenda that subsequent Parts pursue.
In laying out modern Establishment Clause doctrine, this Part arrays the
leading cases into four relatively familiar categories: (1) cases involving
governmental financial assistance to religious institutions; (2) “accommodation”
cases in which the government exempts religious institutions or religiously
motivated actors from legal regulations that otherwise would forbid religiously
required or compel religiously forbidden action; (3) “symbolic support” cases
comprising such matters as crèches, Ten Commandments displays, and “In
God We Trust” on the currency; and (4) cases concerning religion in the

48 For a discussion of parallels and divergences between Establishment Clause and equal
protection doctrine, see Joy Milligan, Religion and Race: On Duality and Entrenchment,
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 393, 394-97 (2012). For a partially analogous exploration of disparities between
Free Exercise Clause doctrine and other bodies of constitutional law, see Frederick Mark Gedicks,
The Normalized Free Exercise Clause: Three Abnormalities, 75 IND. L.J. 77, 81-84 (2000).
49 Even some of the best and otherwise most comprehensive discussions—including KENT
GREENAWALT, 2 RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS (2008),
and HORWITZ , supra note 1—largely overlook standing issues and the connections between meritsbased and standing analysis.
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public schools.50 In light of my emphasis in this Part on anomaly and
confusion, I should point out that an important, implicit premise of the
categorical scheme that I employ here will escape critique: I do not question
that the categories that organize this Part successfully define and differentiate
distinctive doctrinal problems. Moreover, as Part II will argue more explicitly,
the four categories that I employ here are analytically helpful because they
implicitly recognize the existence of distinctive rights or interests to which
the Establishment Clause affords protection, or at least solicitude, of varying
degrees. In short, diversity and multiplicity in Establishment Clause doctrine
are endemic and ineradicable.
Because Establishment Clause cases have notoriously divided the
Supreme Court, my review of the case law will sometimes focus on divisions
among the Justices as well as on the positions that prevailed in leading
decisions. In discussing divisions, I shall sometimes refer to “liberal” and
“conservative” Justices.51 Despite risks of oversimplification, this approach
50 For analogous classificatory arrangements, see DANIEL O. CONKLE, RELIGION, LAW, AND
THE CONSTITUTION 191 (2016) (dividing the cases into “religion and the public schools,” “religious

expression and symbolism in other public contexts,” and “public aid to religious schools,
organizations, and individuals”); WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 47, at 155 (categorizing cases as
involving religion in the public schools, the place of government in religious schools, and “the place
of religion in public life and public policy”); Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of
Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. R EV. 155,
156 (2004) (discussing the “three major lines of religious liberty cases: funding of religious
organizations, regulation of religious practice, and sponsorship and regulation of religious speech”).
I do not claim that absolutely all Establishment Clause cases fit into one of these categories.
Consistent with that recognized limitation, I make no effort to analyze, or to prescribe frameworks
for analyzing, other kinds of cases.
51 What I call “liberals” largely correspond to what others have called “separationists.” See, e.g.,
HORWITZ , supra note 1, at 225-28; Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism,
62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230, 231 (1994). According to Professor Horwitz:
Separationism . . . suggested that “religion should be private rather than public.”
Second, it meant that any law that lacked a secular purpose was inconsistent with the
Establishment Clause. Third, read broadly it prohibited a broad variety of common
government actions that appeared to teach or endorse religion . . . . Fourth, . . .
separationists argued that “[n]o tax in any amount, large or small,” could be used to
support religion.
HORWITZ , supra note 1, at 227 (footnotes omitted). What I call “conservatives” approximate, though
less closely, what Professor Horwitz calls “accommodationism”: “Accommodationists argue that the
Establishment Clause is not violated by laws that attempt to make room for religious beliefs and
observances that many people hold dear.” Id. at 228. The “conservative” view, as I understand it, also
includes a reliance on “neutrality” to justify government support for religion in some contexts—for
example, in the provision of financial assistance to religious institutions—but not in others. At a not
terribly distant historical point, liberals tended to look sympathetically on demands for religious
accommodation, but the political valence with regard to accommodation appears to have shifted in
more recent years. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Justice Brennan’s Accommodating Approach Toward
Religion, 95 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2187 (2007) (discussing Justice Brennan’s nuanced approach to
balancing between free exercise rights and prohibition on the establishment of religion). The shift
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will make it possible to identify points of confusion or inconsistency among
frequently allied groups of Justices. This categorizing tactic will also aid my
effort to craft reform proposals that may have different appeals to those who
are categorized as holding generally liberal or conservative views. It should
also promote recognition that the positions of both liberal and conservative
Justices have displayed internal conflicts and inconsistencies. Neither camp
offers a path to an attractive, coherent doctrinal future.
A. Cases Involving Material or Financial Support for Religion
All agree that a tax levied specifically to support a religious institution—
however small the tax might be—would constitute a paradigmatic violation
of the Establishment Clause.52 Issues arise as the relationship between tax
levies and support for religious institutions or practice becomes more
attenuated, typically along one or both of two dimensions. First, most tax
levies are general, not linked to the promotion of religion. Second, many
governmental expenditures that benefit religious institutions also provide
parallel support to secular organizations.
The two leading modern cases are Mitchell v. Helms53 and Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris.54 Both make neutrality in distribution between religious and
nonreligious beneficiaries—in the sense of making the same assistance
available to both, without formal distinction55—a touchstone of constitutional
permissibility under the Establishment Clause.56 Mitchell upheld a federal
program that loaned “secular, neutral, and non-ideological” educational
appears to respond at least in part to exemptions of religious institutions and religiously motivated
service providers from mandates to provide contraceptive coverage to women and from
antidiscrimination norms otherwise applicable to same-sex weddings and surrounding celebrations.
On the political and social context of disputes over religious accommodations, see Douglas Laycock,
Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. I LL. L. REV. 839, 846.
52 See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
53 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
54 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
55 With regard to different possible senses of neutrality, see supra note 20.
56 Earlier cases from the 1970s and 1980s had imposed a more complex and confusing pattern
of restrictions on the provision of financial benefits to sectarian institutions. See, e.g., Aguilar v.
Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 413-14 (1985) (finding a New York City program to provide remedial education
in parochial schools unconstitutional due to the pervasively sectarian environment), overruled by
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226-27 (1997) (holding that secular education could be funded even
if it took place on sectarian premises provided that no sectarian indoctrination was permitted);
Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 380-81 (1985) (striking down a city program to
provide secular education funding for religious schools), overruled in part by Agostini, 521 U.S. at
235-36. For discussion of cases from the earlier era, see CONKLE, supra note 50, at 219-22.
John C. Jeffries, Jr. and James E. Ryan ascribe the rulings during that era to a “pervasive secularism
that came to dominate American public life, especially among educated elites” and trace subsequent
changes to shifting political currents that have produced alliances among Catholics and evangelical
Christians. A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 281 (2001).
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materials to both public and private schools.57 Speaking for a plurality of four,
Justice Thomas wrote that in cases of this kind, “we have consistently turned to
the principle of neutrality.”58 He continued: “[I]f the government, seeking to
further some legitimate secular purpose, offers aid on the same terms, without
regard to religion, to all who adequately further that purpose, then it is fair to
say that any aid going to a religious recipient only has the effect of furthering
that secular purpose.”59 Concurring, Justice O’Connor would have added the
requirement that governmental aid must not actually be used for religious
purposes—as would happen if, for example, a church-affiliated school
employed government-loaned materials in the teaching of religious dogma.60
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris upheld a school voucher scheme that provided low
income parents with financial support for tuition at private schools.61 The
program allowed parents to cash the vouchers at religious as well as secular
institutions. Although far more voucher recipients attended parochial than
secular private schools,62 the Court deemed it decisive that state money found its
way to religiously affiliated institutions only as a result of private choice.63 The
majority saw no objection under the Establishment Clause when “neutral
government programs . . . provide aid directly to a broad class of individuals, who,
in turn, direct the aid to religious schools or institutions of their own choosing.”64
If we look for the basis for standing in challenges to governmental
expenditures and other distributions of material aid that benefit religious
institutions, the principal ground comes from Flast. In diverse contexts, the
Supreme Court has affirmed that standing requires “injury in fact.”65 And
ordinarily, the Court has held, any purported injury that a taxpayer suffers

57
58
59
60
61
62

530 U.S. at 802 (plurality opinion) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7372(a)(1) (1994)).
Id. at 809. Justice Thomas was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy.
Id. at 810 (citation omitted).
Id. at 840 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
536 U.S. 639, 644-48 (2002).
Forty-six of fifty-six private schools participating in the Ohio program at the time of the
litigation were religiously affiliated. Id. at 655.
63 Id. at 649 (distinguishing between “government programs that provide aid directly” and
“programs of true private choice, in which government aid reaches religious schools only as a result
of the genuine and independent choices of private individuals”).
64 Id.
65 For cases explaining that establishing standing requires an injury in fact, a causal link
between the injury and the action complained of, and a likelihood that the injury will be redressed
by a favorable decision, see Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 134 (2011)
(holding that plaintiffs did not have standing as tax payers when the state provided a tuition tax
credit to private religious schools); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (holding
that the Earth Island Institute did not have standing because no application of the relevant Forest
Service regulations threatened imminent harm); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000) (holding that the environmental group plaintiffs still had
standing, even after the defendant had come into compliance and ceased the relevant unlawful conduct).
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from expenditures by the state or federal government does not suffice.66 In
Flast, the Court crafted an exception. Emphasizing the Establishment
Clause’s historic purpose of protecting taxpayers from being coerced to
support a state-sponsored religion, Flast predicated taxpayer standing on the
satisfaction of a “double nexus” test: “First, the taxpayer must establish a
logical link between that status and the type of legislative enactment attacked
. . . . Secondly, the taxpayer must establish a nexus between that status and
the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged.”67 On the facts
before it, the Flast Court found that the link between taxpayer status and
exercises by Congress of the taxing and spending power met the first
requirement.68 The second nexus, the Court held, existed between taxpayer
status and the Establishment Clause.69
Recent decades have witnessed recurring battles aimed at limiting Flast if
not overthrowing it entirely. The first broadside came in Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., which held that
the respondents lacked standing as taxpayers to challenge the donation of
surplus federal property to a church college.70 According to the majority, “Flast
limited taxpayer standing” to challenges to enactments under the Taxing and
Spending Clause.71 Because the legislation that underlay the challenged
conveyance in Valley Forge was “an evident exercise of Congress’ power under”
a clause authorizing it to “dispose of” federal property, Flast did not apply.72
In Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., taxpayers challenged a
number of federal executive actions that, they said, violated the
Establishment Clause by expending public funds to promote religious
community groups over secular ones.73 Justice Alito’s plurality opinion—for
himself, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Kennedy—distinguished Flast on
the ground that the expenditures at issue did not occur pursuant to any
particular act of Congress appropriating money for religious groups or
purposes, but instead stemmed from executive action.74 The other six Justices
all thought Flast indistinguishable. Justices Scalia and Thomas would have
66 See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 348 (2006) (distinguishing Flast and
affirming “the principle, underlying the Article III prohibition on taxpayer suits, that a litigant may
not assume a particular disposition of government funds in establishing standing”).
67 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
68 Id. at 103-06.
69 Id.
70 454 U.S. 464, 482 (1982).
71 Id. at 479.
72 Id. at 480, 466 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have power to
dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property
belonging to the United States . . . .”)).
73 551 U.S. 587, 592 (2007).
74 Id. at 605 (plurality opinion).
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overruled Flast.75 Four dissenting Justices maintained that “[w]hen executive
agencies spend identifiable sums of tax money for religious purposes, no less
than when Congress authorizes the same thing, taxpayers suffer injury.”76
Most recently came Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v.
Winn,77 in which the Court found that a taxpayer lacked standing to challenge
a scheme of dollar-for-dollar tax credits for donations to organizations that
support religious schools. A “tax credit is not tantamount to a religious tax or
to a tithe and does not visit the injury identified in Flast,” Justice Kennedy
reasoned for a 5-4 majority.78
Following Valley Forge, Hein, and Winn, one might wonder whether Flast
hangs by a thread. So far, however, only Justice Thomas and the late Justice
Scalia have explicitly stated that Flast should be overruled.79
Nonetheless, a puzzle remains. If we look back at cases in which the Court’s
conservative Justices applied their neutrality test to uphold statutes providing
material benefits to religious organizations and activities, it is not clear on what
basis Justices Scalia and Thomas would have thought that the challengers had
standing. If not as taxpayers, then how? Strikingly, the Court made no mention
of standing in either Zelman v. Simmons-Harris or Mitchell v. Helms.80
In contrast with the Justices who view Flast skeptically, the liberal Justices
would presumably think standing obvious in cases such as Zelman and Mitchell
based on Flast’s authority. With regard to the merits, however, the liberals
dissented in both cases.81 Their preferred tests for gauging governmental
expenditures that violate the Establishment Clause have tended to be relatively
fact-specific, focused on the nature and extent of the benefit that religious
institutions derive from facially neutral programs.82

75
76
77
78
79

Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 639 (Souter, J., dissenting).
563 U.S. 125, 130 (2011).
Id. at 142-43.
Id. at 146-47 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy, who joined the Hein plurality, wrote
separately to affirm his commitment to Flast. See Hein, 551 U.S. at 615-16 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
80 In Zelman, the Court noted in passing that the respondents were “taxpayers,” which may
have been shorthand for finding standing under Flast. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,
648 (2002). The plurality opinion in Mitchell said nothing about the identity of the respondents,
see Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 803 (2000) (plurality opinion), although Justice Souter
mentioned in dissent that one of the respondents was a parishioner and parent who objected to the
provision of government aid to her parish school. Id. at 902 n.20, 913 & n.30 (Souter, J., dissenting).
81 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 684 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 686 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 717
(Breyer, J., dissenting); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 867 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer broke with
the dissenting liberal Justices in Mitchell to join Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in the judgment,
despite dissenting in Zelman. See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
82 See, e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. at 726-28 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (distinguishing school vouchers
“in both kind and degree from aid programs upheld in the past” under the Establishment Clause);
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 869 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court has isolated no single test of
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B. Accommodation Cases
The second category of Establishment Clause cases involves government
attempts to accommodate religious institutions or religiously motivated
individuals by carving out exceptions from generally applicable laws. The
Supreme Court has given a wide but not unlimited berth to such endeavors.
Cutter v. Wilkinson83 unanimously upheld the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), which provides that “[n]o
government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a
person residing . . . in an institution” unless the burden furthers “a compelling
governmental interest” and does so by “the least restrictive means.”84 In
rejecting a facial challenge, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion emphasized that
RLUIPA “alleviates exceptional government-created burdens on private
religious exercise” and “take[s] adequate account of the burdens a requested
accommodation may impose on non-beneficiaries.”85 Although Cutter can
surely be reconciled with prior authorities, it leaves a number of matters
unexplained, including when and to what extent third-party burdens matter
to judicial analysis. In 1985, Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. imposed a limit on the
accommodations that the Establishment Clause will tolerate by invalidating
a Connecticut mandate “that those who observe a Sabbath any day of the
week as a matter of religious conviction must be relieved of the duty to work
on that day, no matter what burden or inconvenience this imposes on the
employer or fellow workers.”86 Two years later, however, in Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,87 the
Court upheld an amendment to the 1964 Civil Rights Act that exempts religious
organizations from the Act’s prohibitions against employment discrimination on the
basis of religion. In Amos, the Court found it acceptable that a religiously disfavored
employee lost his job as a result of the exemption.88
Among the other issues with which the leading cases fail to come
convincingly to grips is the conflict framed by attempted accommodations
that require the government to classify people and institutions based on their
religious beliefs. If statutes that classify people based on their religious
beliefs, and accordingly subject them to disparate treatment, were challenged
under either freedom of thought and association principles that inhere in the

constitutional sufficiency . . . . Particular factual circumstances control, and the answer is a matter
of judgment.”).
83 544 U.S. 709, 714 (2005).
84 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a) (2012).
85 Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720.
86 472 U.S. 703, 708-09 (1985).
87 483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987).
88 Id. at 338-39.
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Free Speech Clause89 or under the equal protection principles that mark
classifications along religious lines as “suspect,”90 Supreme Court precedents
would suggest that elevated scrutiny ought to apply.91 Under the
Establishment Clause, too, one might think religious accommodation statutes
could best be justified—if and when they are justifiable—on the ground that
the accommodations are closely tailored to a compelling governmental
interest. Yet the Supreme Court appears never expressly to have adopted such
an approach under the Establishment Clause.
To date, standing has never emerged as an issue in Supreme Court cases
challenging exceptions to otherwise applicable regulations for religiously
motivated people and activities. In all of the leading decisions, the challenger
has suffered a palpable harm, such as the denial of an accommodation or the
financial burden of needing to accommodate someone else’s wish to engage
in religiously motivated activities.92 But standing to challenge
accommodation statutes might be less than obvious in other, imaginable
cases—for example, if someone alleged that draft exemptions for religiously
motivated conscientious objectors increased her chances of being conscripted.
C. Cases Involving Nonmaterial, Symbolic Support for Religion
A third, recurrently important category of Establishment Clause cases
involves governmental provision of symbolic support for religion by, for
example, displaying religious symbols or asserting religious messages. The
Court’s decisions within this category form a variegated pattern. By closely
divided votes in every instance, the Court upheld a crèche display in Lynch v.
Donnelly,93 when the crèche stood alongside other holiday symbols that
included reindeer, a teddy bear, and hundreds of colored lights,94 but
invalidated a crèche display in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties

89 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) (“[S]tate action
which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny”).
90 See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text.
91 See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990) (summarizing equal protection and
free exercise precedents and concluding that “[j]ust as we subject to the most exacting scrutiny laws
that make classifications based on race . . . or on the content of speech . . . so too we strictly
scrutinize governmental classifications based on religion.”).
92 See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 (2005) (challenging limitations on prisoners’
ability to engage in religious exercise); Amos, 483 U.S. at 339 (challenging religiously-based
employment discrimination); Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709-10 (1985) (challenging
burdens imposed by a statute granting employees the right to abstain from work on any day they
designated as a religious Sabbath).
93 465 U.S. 668, 681 (1983).
94 Id. at 671.
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Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter95 when it stood alone.96 The Court ruled that
a public exhibition of the Ten Commandments violated the Establishment
Clause in McCreary County v. ACLU,97 but determined that a longer-standing
Ten Commandments monument, in Van Orden v. Perry,98 did not. The
Justices long ago invalidated prayer in the public schools,99 and have
forbidden prayer at school graduation ceremonies,100 but they have allowed
prayer by legislative chaplains101 and by invited clergy at the beginning of
public meetings of town government.102
No cases have so far come before the Court involving what Justice Breyer
has called “references to, and invocations of, the Deity in the public words of
public officials; the public references to God on coins, decrees, and buildings;
[and] the attention paid to the religious objectives of certain holidays,
including Thanksgiving.”103 These practices are an obvious source of
discomfiture for judicial liberals, who have often professed adherence to the
three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, which deems a statute or policy invalid
if it (1) lacks a “secular legislative purpose,” (2) has a “principal or primary
effect” that either “advances [or] inhibits religion,” or (3) “foster[s] ‘an
excessive government entanglement with religion.’”104 William J. Brennan,
who was the leading liberal Justice of his era, once explained uneasily that
“such practices as the designation of ‘In God We Trust’ as our national motto,
or the references to God contained in the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag can
best be understood . . . as a form [of] ‘ceremonial deism,’ protected from
Establishment Clause scrutiny chiefly because they have lost through rote
repetition any significant religious content.”105 With regard to the prong of
the Lemon test that requires statutes to have a secular purpose, Justice
Brennan apparently proposed—at least for “ceremonial deism” cases—to
disassociate statutory purposes from the subjective intent of the enacting
legislature and to deem Lemon satisfied as long as a law or practice “serve[d]
such wholly secular purposes as solemnizing public occasions, or inspiring
commitment to meet some national challenge in a manner that simply could
95 492 U.S. 573, 601 (1989).
96 Id. at 579-81 (plurality opinion).
97 545 U.S. 844, 872-74 (2005).
98 545 U.S. 677, 688-90 (2005).
99 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962).
100 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992).
101 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788 (1983).
102 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1822-23 (2014).
103 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 699 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
104 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S.

664, 668 (1970)). In
Agostini v. Felton, the Court recast the entanglement inquiry as part of the inquiry into a statute’s
principal or primary effect. 521 U.S. 203, 232-33 (1997).
105 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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not be fully served in our culture if government were limited to
purely non-religious phrases.”106 In other cases, by contrast, Justice Brennan
and other judicial liberals have understood the “purpose” prong of the Lemon
test as contemplating inquiry into the actual, subjective, predominant
intentions of the legislature at the time when it enacted a statute.107
With all of these cases in mind, the conservative Justices have generally
rejected the Lemon test and any glosses on it108 as applied to symbolic
establishment issues. In County of Allegheny, Justice Kennedy wrote for four
conservatives in arguing that symbolic support for religion does not violate
the Establishment Clause absent coercion or sustained one-sect
proselytization.109 In Town of Greece v. Galloway, he relied on historical
practice in ruling that a town did not contravene the Establishment Clause
by opening its board meetings with a prayer, which did not necessarily have
to be nonsectarian.110
When one stands back to scan the gamut of symbolic support cases, no
clear test of constitutional validity emerges. In addition to the approaches
that I have described already, several cases have adopted a suggestion by
Justice O’Connor and held that a statute has a principal or primary effect of
promoting religion—and thus fails the Lemon test—if a reasonable, objective
observer would view its purpose as one of endorsing religion.111 I shall say
more about this test below. The Court’s opinions in several leading cases have
eschewed reliance on any general test at all.112
In addition, standing once again presents puzzles. Consider the
conservative Justices’ conclusion in County of Allegheny that “the permanent
erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall” would violate the
Establishment Clause “because such an obtrusive year-round religious display
would place the government’s weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize on
106
107

Id. at 717.
See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59-60 (1985) (invalidating a statute authorizing a
period of silence in all public schools “for meditation or voluntary prayer” based on evidence of
subjective legislative intent to promote prayer).
108 For a description of a proposed gloss that would use the perspective of objective observer
to measure a statute’s principal or primary effect, see infra note 111. On conservatives’ rejection of
that proposed gloss, see infra notes 269–71 and accompanying text.
109 County. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
110 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1822 (2014).
111 See, e.g., McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005) (upholding the
examination of legislative purpose as part of the Lemon test but equating purpose with the
perceptions of a “reasonable observer”); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000)
(quoting Wallace that it is relevant to ask “whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text,
legislative history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement” of
religion).
112 See supra note 11.
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behalf of a particular religion.”113 Despite the conservatives’ acknowledgement that
a violation would occur, one wonders who, if anyone, they thought would have
standing to sue to terminate the violation—especially if, for example, a private
group bought and installed the cross, so that taxpayer standing would not exist.
The Court’s opinions give no guidance concerning this question.
Remarkably, in most of the symbolic speech cases that have reached the
Supreme Court, the Justices’ opinions have not referred to standing.114
D. Religion in the Public Schools
In pathbreaking cases decided during the 1960s, the Supreme Court held
that officially sponsored prayer115 and Bible-reading116 in the public schools
violated the Establishment Clause. One could imagine that the conservative
majority that decided Town of Greece v. Galloway would want to reconsider
the school prayer decisions. But apart from Justice Thomas, who questions
whether the Establishment Clause should apply to state and local
governments at all,117 the conservative Justices have not contested the
principle—traceable to the school prayer cases—that the government must
not employ its coercive power to compel school attendance to inculcate
religious belief in impressionable young people.118 In Santa Fe Independent
School District v. Doe, a 6-3 majority affirmed that the Establishment Clause
forbids “government speech endorsing religion” in the public schools.119
Nevertheless, the Justices have divided repeatedly about that principle’s
proper application. To enforce the requirement of non-endorsement of religion
in public education, liberals—for so long as they had five votes—often relied on
the Lemon test to invalidate legislation or policies based on forbidden
governmental purposes. They did so, for example, in Wallace v. Jaffree, which
struck down a state statute authorizing a moment of silence “for meditation
or voluntary prayer” on the ground that the statute had a forbidden purpose

113
114
115
116
117

492 U.S. 573, 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962).
Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226-27 (1963).
See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49-50 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that “the Establishment Clause is best understood as a
federalism provision—it protects state establishments from federal interference but does not protect
any individual rights”—and that it therefore makes little sense to treat it as “incorporated” and
enforceable against state and local governments).
118 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 643 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that
“school prayer occurs within a framework in which legal coercion to attend school (i.e., coercion
under threat of penalty) provides the ultimate backdrop” and that “the classroom is inherently an
instructional setting”).
119 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000).

82

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 166: 59

of promoting religion.120 The Court reached a similar conclusion, in Edwards
v. Aguillard, concerning a statute providing that if public school teachers
taught evolution, they must also present the alternative theory of “creation
science.”121 By contrast, conservatives have relatively consistently excoriated
the Lemon test, as much in school cases as in others.
In more recent years, a more conservative Court has frequently drawn a
line between pro-religious speech that occurs within the educational program
pursuant to government sponsorship—and remains forbidden—and private
speech occurring within school facilities.122 Pursuant to this distinction, the
Justices have upheld programs and statutes that grant religious groups and
speakers the same after-school access to school facilities as their secular
counterparts.123 Liberals have often dissented, protesting that impressionable
school children would perceive religious speech and activities on school
premises as carrying the government’s imprimatur.124
In the important case of Lee v. Weisman,125 Justice Kennedy split from his
characteristic conservative allies to join four liberal Justices in holding that
prayer by a clergyman at a public school graduation ceremony violated the
Establishment Clause due to coercive aspects of the setting. Impressionable
students, he reasoned, would experience “public pressure, as well as peer
pressure . . . to stand as a group or, at least, maintain respectful silence during
the invocation and benediction.”126 In his judgment, “[t]his pressure, though
subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion.”127 The other
conservative Justices responded derisively to Justice Kennedy’s finding of
coercion.128 But they did not doubt that school-sponsored prayer would
violate the Establishment Clause if it occurred within a school’s instructional
program.129
120
121
122
123

472 U.S. 38 (1985).
482 U.S. 578, 597 (1987).
See Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 302.
See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (holding that the denial
of school room use to a private religious organization amounted to unconstitutional discrimination
against religion); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (enforcing a public
school’s statutory obligation not to discriminate against a Christian student club and finding that
the mandate did not violate the Establishment Clause).
124 See, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 142-43 (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasizing “the
particular impressionability of schoolchildren” and calling for “special protection . . . for those in
the elementary grades” from religious indoctrination).
125 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
126 Id. at 593.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I see no warrant for expanding the concept of coercion
beyond acts backed by threat of penalty—a brand of coercion that, happily, is readily discernible to
those of us who have made a career of reading the disciples of Blackstone rather than of Freud.”).
129 Id. at 643.
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In only one case involving religion in the public schools has the Court
divided about standing. In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, the
Court held, by 5 to 3, that the father of a schoolchild lacked “prudential”
standing to challenge a daily classroom recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance,
which since 1954 has included the words “under God.”130 Because the girl’s
mother opposed the action, Newdow, as a matter of California law, could not
sue as his daughter’s representative, but only on his own behalf.131 Under the
circumstances, the Court’s majority asserted a discretionary prerogative to
dismiss the action for want of standing in order to avoid interference with
relations governed by California family law.132 Dissenting from that ruling,
Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the Court had misapplied prudential
standing principles. In his view, the Court should have decided the case on
the merits after upholding Article III standing based on a cognizable injury
to the father’s state-recognized “right to influence his daughter’s religious
upbringing.”133 For the majority, Justice Stevens did not dispute that the
father had suffered an injury adequate to permit standing under Article III if
prudential considerations had not warranted dismissal.134
In none of its leading cases has the Court ever questioned the standing of a
student, when suing on her own behalf, to object to being subjected to religious
teaching or unwanted attempts at religious influence in the public schools.
Recalling the conservative Justices’ skepticism of claims of injury in other
contexts, one again might wonder why. One possibility is that student standing
rests on plausible allegations of injury resulting from coercion—even if no
coercion is ultimately found to exist. But the Court, without conservative
objections to the plaintiffs’ standing, has ruled on cases in which the only
plausible claim of coercion involved coerced exposure (through required school
attendance) to governmental endorsement of religion. In Stone v. Graham, for
example, the Court invalidated a state statute that called for public schools to
display copies of the Ten Commandments paid for by private funds, even though
the law did not require students to do or say anything. 135
E. Concluding Observations
Overall, the existing scheme of Establishment Clause doctrine reveals
disarray along multiple dimensions. Although the prevailing confusion has many
130
131
132
133
134

542 U.S. 1, 17-18 (2002).
Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 23 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 18 n.8 (“Even if [Newdow’s] arguments suffice to establish Article III standing, they
do not respond to our prudential concerns.”).
135 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
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contributing causes, two related factors stand out. The first is over-ambition by
shifting coalitions of Justices in seeking to unify Establishment Clause
doctrine pursuant to a master, substantive test or principle that can apply
trans-categorically. The Lemon test, which purports to ban all statutes and
policies with either the predominant purpose or primary effect of promoting
religion, furnishes the best-known example. Even in its heyday, Lemon invited
and possibly required evasion and manipulation—for example, in cases
involving such historically entrenched practices as tax breaks for churches and
many of the symbolic supports for religion that Justice Brennan sought to
categorize under the heading of “ceremonial deism.”136 Analogous proposals
to order the entirety of Establishment Clause doctrine based on a general
principle of non-coercion and condemnation of one-sect proselytization,
coupled with a professedly absolute tolerance for other governmental aid to
religion, seem similarly procrustean. Among other difficulties, conservatives
have so far failed to align their acknowledgment that one-sect proselytization
would violate the Establishment Clause with a satisfactory account of who
would have standing to challenge “the permanent erection of a large Latin
cross on the roof of city hall.”137
A second major contributor to doctrinal incoherence is a tendency by the
Supreme Court to craft Establishment Clause doctrine without taking a
sufficiently wide-angle view of the constitutional landscape. One vivid example
involves the misalignment of merits and standing doctrines. Another resides in
the Justices’ failure to draw lessons from doctrines in other constitutional
domains that apply tiers of scrutiny and take account of governmental interests
that can sometimes justify prima facie infringements of individual rights.
II. ELEMENTS OF A STRATEGY FOR REFORM
This Part lays out a general, two-part strategy for the rehabilitation of
Establishment Clause doctrine. One aspect proposes a scheme of analytically
sequenced, tiered judicial scrutiny analogous to that used to enforce the Free
Speech, Free Exercise, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses. This
proposal is bold in one respect: tiered scrutiny plays no visible role under
current Establishment Clause law. But my suggestion is modest in another way:
rather than starting from scratch, it calls for distilling the rights and interests
that would trigger elevated judicial scrutiny from existing doctrinal categories.
The other primary suggested reform involves the realignment of standing

136
137

See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text.
County. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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doctrine in light of the rights and interests that the substantive components of
Establishment Clause doctrine implicitly or explicitly recognize.
This Part focuses more on conceptual foundations than on doctrinal detail.
Part III will offer specific recommendations for implementing the reform
agenda that this Part lays out with regard to substantive Establishment Clause
doctrine. Part IV will do the same with respect to standing.
A. Embracing and Implementing a Regime of Sequenced, Tiered Judicial Scrutiny
My proposal for a regime of analytically sequenced, tiered judicial
scrutiny requires defense and elaboration along two main dimensions. First,
I argue that there are important benefits to tiered review that analyzes
presumptive violations of protected rights in light of potentially justifying
governmental interests. Second, I offer an attractive, workable approach to
identifying the presumptively protected rights or interests any infringement
of which would call for more or less searching judicial review.
1. In Defense of Tiers and a Weighing of Governmental Interests
The case for an analytically sequenced, tiered scheme of judicial review
begins with the premise that Establishment Clause cases—like those
under the Free Speech, Equal Protection, Due Process, and Free Exercise
Clauses—often present conflicts between competing values of
fundamental constitutional significance. One example arises when the
government classifies citizens on the basis of their religious beliefs for the
purpose of sparing religious believers from needing to choose between
breaching their religious duties and violating the secular law. On the one
hand, religiously-based classifications pose dangers of division and
unfairness that make such classifications suspect under the Equal
Protection Clause.138 On the other hand, the government has powerful
reasons, rooted in free exercise values, to want to spare citizens the cruel
choice of deciding whether to disobey either the government or their God.139
Another example resides in longstanding practices of granting tax advantages
and various forms of material assistance—which can range from police and
fire protection to support for parochial schools—to churches or religious
activities. In light of well-justified anxieties about taxation to support
religious institutions, direct and indirect financial assistance ought to be
regarded as threatening interests that the Establishment Clause protects. But
sometimes such aid might be justified by sufficiently important governmental

138
139

See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 232–61 and accompanying text.
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interests—for example, in preventing crime or in ensuring that students who
choose to attend parochial schools receive competent instruction in secular
subjects.140 Some, of course, would argue that there is no sufficiently
important government interest in the latter of these two cases. Whatever
one’s view about the strength of the government’s interest, my principal point
is simply that a clash of values is involved that constitutional doctrine and
judicial analysis ought to acknowledge and address openly.
As surveyed in Part I, Establishment Clause doctrine has never
recognized that sufficiently important or compelling governmental interests
could justify the infringement of presumptively protected rights.141 But
insistence that government interests have no role in determining the success
of Establishment Clause claims is either dishonest or myopic, as on the
disorderly doctrinal pattern that emerged from Part I conclusively attests.
Existing law does not accord absolute protection to all interests grounded in
the Establishment Clause, nor could it sensibly do so. If consideration of
competing values does not occur on the surface of the doctrine, it manifestly
happens beneath. And it would be unwarrentedly single-minded to exclude
values that compete with Establishment Clause-based interests and concerns
wholly from account.
Within constitutional law, value conflict is of course not unique to the
Establishment Clause. There is, and should be, no single prevailing approach.
But in other contexts that involve clashes of important constitutional values,
the Supreme Court has evolved a framework of analytically sequenced, tiered
judicial review that is designed to recognize the constitutional (and often the
moral) complexity of collisions between genuinely fundamental rights, which
ought not be lightly “balanced” away, and governmental interests of high
importance.142 That framework asks first whether a fundamental right is
implicated or infringed. If so, it shifts the burden to the government to establish
that a sufficiently compelling governmental interest justifies the challenged
practice. In cases subject to “strict” judicial scrutiny, infringements of
fundamental rights fail judicial review unless “necessary” or “narrowly tailored”
to promote a “compelling” governmental interest.143 A slightly weaker variant
of analytically sequenced, tiered analysis is intermediate scrutiny, under which

140
141
142

See infra notes 203–26 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 6–11 and accompanying text.
See generally Fallon, supra note 2, at 1293-94 (explaining the historical emergence of
“fundamental rights” protected by the “strict scrutiny” formula as “a restraint on the impulse to
balance away civil liberties”).
143 E.g. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2209-14 (2016); Citizens United v. FEC,
588 U.S. 310, 340 (2010); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005). For discussion of
indeterminacies in this formula and vagaries in its application, see Fallon, supra note 2.
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courts ask a question such as whether the infringement of a right is substantially
related to important governmental interests.144
Although not perfect by anyone’s lights, analytically sequenced, tiered
scrutiny successfully highlights clashes of values and promotes nuanced
analysis in cases involving arguably justifiable infringements of fundamental
rights. An important indicator of the attractiveness of an analytically
sequenced, tiered-scrutiny regime comes from comparisons of U.S. doctrine
with the constitutional law of other nations. An emerging international
consensus recognizes that the judicial protection of fundamental rights best
follows a two-staged sequence, involving an initial determination of whether
a right or interest is presumptively protected and, if so, a further inquiry into
whether it must yield to sufficiently important countervailing interests. The
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms exemplifies this design when it
states that “guarantees of the rights and freedoms set out in it [are] subject
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society.”145 An even more prominent
example of analytically sequenced judicial analysis involves the
proportionality review that many liberal democracies—including a number of
western European nations, post-Communist states in Central and Eastern
Europe, Israel, South Africa, and New Zealand—use to enforce fundamental
rights.146 Under it, courts first ask whether fundamental rights have been
restricted. If so, they apply a multifactor test to determine whether ultimate
violations should be found.147
144 This is perhaps the most familiar formulation of an intermediate scrutiny test, introduced
for cases involving gender discrimination in Craig v. Boren. 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (invalidating a
statute that established different drinking ages for men and women). For the most recent
formulation in a case involving gender-based discrimination, emphasizing any disparity must have
an “exceedingly persuasive” justification, see Sessions v Morales-Santana. 137 S.Ct. 1678, 1690 (2017)
(holding that a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act violated equal protection by giving
unmarried women a preference over unmarried men (and married couples) in conferring their U.S.
citizenship on children born abroad). On alternative formulations of intermediate scrutiny tests in
other doctrine contexts, see Fallon, supra note 2, at 1299-1301.
145 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.).
146 See Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism,
47 COLUM. J. TRANSNATIONAL L. 72, 74 (2008) (describing the spread of proportionality analysis
from Germany to other countries in Europe and beyond); see also Carlos Bernal Pulido,
The Migration of Proportionality Across Europe, 11 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT’L L. 483, 499-500 (2013) (listing
states where proportionality analysis has been adopted); Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat,
Proportionality and the Culture of Justification, 59 AM. J. COMPARATIVE L. 463, 465 (2011)
(documenting the spread of proportionality analysis).
147 In its original German form, proportionality review consists of a three-stage analysis that
asks whether (1) a legislative measure restricting basic rights is rationally related to a desired end,
(2) the measure impairs the right or freedom in question as little as possible, and (3) an infringement
of rights is proportionate to the desired objective. See Francis G. Jacobs, Recent Developments in the
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The clarifying benefits of applying a sequenced, tiered-scrutiny regime to
the Establishment Clause begin to emerge at the first step of analysis. The
step-one question is whether a challenged governmental action comes within
the “coverage,”148 or the ambit of protective concern, of a constitutional
provision such as the Establishment Clause. One could restate this question
as whether the government has impinged on a presumptive constitutional
right or a fundamental interest. This is an important inquiry, meant to
identify fundamental rights or interests any infringement of which ought to
occasion suspicion and trigger searching judicial review. As I shall emphasize
below, not every alleged violation of the Establishment Clause should survive
this threshold inquiry and thereby provoke elevated scrutiny. (To foreshadow
a concrete example, some expressions of symbolic governmental support for
religion, such as printing “In God We Trust” on the currency, should not be
deemed to violate any presumptively protected rights.149)
If the step-one threshold is surmounted, analytically sequenced, tiered
frameworks thrust a burden of justification onto the government to demonstrate
that a challenged action or practice both serves important goals and minimizes
harm to protected values or interests. Importantly, the step-two analysis calls
for more than mere “balancing.” The demand for the government to justify
its infringement on a right or interest by demonstrating close tailoring to a
compelling (or in some cases an important) governmental interest takes
seriously the fundamentality of the rights-based interests at stake.
Some may insist that the Establishment Clause demands an even more
categorical analysis, partly because of its structural function in ensuring
separation between secular government and religion. There is rhetorical power
in the protest that the Constitution recognizes no possible justification for a
practice that is properly deemed to be “an establishment of religion.”150 But this
formulation is either tautological or question-begging. Within an elevated
scrutiny framework, the question is not whether an establishment of religion

Principle of Proportionality in European Law, in THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE
LAWS OF EUROPE 1, 1 (Evelyn Ellis, ed., 1999); see also NICHOLAS EMILIOU, THE PRINCIPLE OF
PROPORTIONALITY IN EUROPEAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 268 (1996). Different
jurisdictions now use somewhat varied protocols. See Vicki C. Jackson, Being Proportional About
Proportionality, 21 C ONST. C OMMENTARY 803, 806-07 (2004) (book review). For a comparative
discussion of proportionality doctrine as exercised in French, Belgian, Dutch, and British law, see
Walter Van Gerven, The Effect of Proportionality on the Actions of Member States of the European
Community: National Viewpoints from Continental Europe, in THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY
IN THE LAWS OF EUROPE 37, 37 (Evelyn Ellis, ed., 1999). For an exploration of the limited use of
proportionality principles in U.S. constitutional law, see Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an
Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 2680 (2015).
148 Schauer, supra note 3.
149 See infra notes 262–83 and accompanying text.
150 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 6, at 1276-77.
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can be justified. It is whether a practice that exhibits certain hallmarks of an
establishment of religion should ultimately be condemned as constituting one.
The narrow tailoring of a particular practice to a compelling governmental
interest would indicate that it is not an “establishment of religion” in the
forbidden sense and ultimately violates no constitutional right.
As I have argued, moreover, any purported absolutism is almost inevitably
more of a façade than a reality, due to the need to accommodate competing
values. Historically entrenched practice and precedent further undermine
arguments for rules that would dismiss otherwise compelling governmental
interests as categorically irrelevant. It is both desirable, and ample, that step-one
determinations that the government has infringed a fundamental right or interest
under the Establishment Clause should shift the burden to the government to
demonstrate that it has an unusually potent justification for doing so.
In touting sequenced, tiered scrutiny, I make no claim to offer a panacea.
Especially in recent years, the Supreme Court has sometimes blurred the sharp
lines between strict scrutiny and rational basis review, with a resulting diminution
in those categories’ analytically structuring benefits.151 In addition, the Supreme
Court has never laid down rigorous criteria for the derivation of compelling
governmental interests.152 Nevertheless, schemes of sequenced, tiered scrutiny
have endured because of their capacity to structure and discipline judicial
judgment, and thereby to enable illuminating comparisons, even in the absence
of algorithmic determinacy. In the context of the Establishment Clause, elevated
judicial scrutiny—which recognizes the suspect character of certain governmental
classifications, but permits them in cases of narrow tailoring to important
interests—would invite a more appropriately honest and searching analysis than
currently available doctrinal templates elicit.
2. Identifying Presumptively Protected Interests, Rights, and Values
Though sometimes daunting, the first-stage judicial inquiry into whether
challenged governmental action infringes presumptively protected rights
should not prove unmanageable under the Establishment Clause. To
determine which rights or interests properly trigger elevated scrutiny, the
Supreme Court should begin by excavating the presuppositions of the
doctrinal categories that Part I surveyed. When carefully examined, those
categories exhibit an immanent logic in defining distinctive rights and
interests that require differentiated forms of judicial protection. However
confused the patterns of Supreme Court decisions that Part I reviewed may
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See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
See Note, Let the End Be Legitimate: Questioning the Value of Heightened Scrutiny’s Compellingand Important-Interest Inquiries, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1406, 1408-09 (2016).
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appear on the surface, the leading cases embody articulable, sensible, and
often compelling assumptions about guiding Establishment Clause interests
and values, as reflected in judicially recognized rights. As Part I’s doctrinal
summary manifests, these include rights—which admittedly need to be better
defined and delimited—(a) not to be taxed to support religion, (b) not to be
classified and unreasonably disadvantaged on the basis of religion, (c) not to
be symbolically demeaned or marginalized by governmental endorsement of
religion, or coerced into participating in a religious exercise, and (d) not to
be subjected to governmentally sponsored religious instruction or
endorsement as an aspect of public education.
Among this category-based catalogue of rights—none of which is
necessarily absolute in the face of competing governmental interests—the
protected interest in not being taxed to support religion is easily, intuitively
comprehensible and should command nearly universal assent. Everson v.
Board of Education, which many commentators view as having initiated the
modern era of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, said flatly that “[t]he
‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
. . . . No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions.”153 Against the backdrop of history, this
proclamation reflects a forceful, normatively attractive claim of individual
right: the Establishment Clause protects each of us against being taxed or
otherwise coerced to support a religion to which we do not subscribe.154 The
precise contours of this right may be in doubt (for example, in cases in which
general tax revenues flow to churches among other institutions), but its core
is not. One important rationalizing task—which Part III pursues in detail—
is to define the relevant right and to determine the nature of the judicial
protection that it deserves.
The right that is implicit in the second category of cases that Part I
reviewed—not to be classified and unreasonably disadvantaged on the basis
of religion—is also normatively compelling and derives from values of
religious nonpreferentialism and equal citizenship.155 Once again the exact
scope of the right is uncertain and debatable. Throughout history, some
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330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
See FELDMAN, supra note 47, at 41 (“In the debates that led up to the drafting and
ratification of the First Amendment . . . all condemned use of coercive taxes to support religious
institutions with which the taxpayer might disagree.”).
155 See, e.g., C HRISTOPHER L. E ISGRUBER & L AWRENCE G. S AGER , R ELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND THE C ONSTITUTION 4-9 (2007); Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations
of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 9, 12-13 (2004) (“I will suggest that understanding the
proper place of equality in religion clause jurisprudence requires appreciation of a broader range of
values with regard to both religion clauses, and a recognition that this appreciation is itself
independently important.”).
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statutory and even constitutionally mandated accommodations—in the form
of exemptions from otherwise applicable regulatory obligations—have
existed.156 In some instances, third parties have had to bear costs.157
Nonetheless, a right not to be substantially burdened by religious
classifications and benefits for others presumptively obtains, and for readily
understandable reasons. Even in cases having nothing to do with taxation to
support religion, history has shown religion-based classification to be
dangerous.158 When the government employs such classifications, it should,
accordingly, bear a significant burden of justification.
The third kind of Establishment Clause right that emerges from a
category-based analysis—not to be demeaned or marginalized on the basis of
religion, and certainly not to be coerced into religious practice—requires
more complex explication.159 As a doctrinal matter, it seems incontrovertible
that not all governmental expressions of symbolic support for religion
infringe constitutionally protected interests or violate individual rights, no
matter how acute the psychological sense of grievance that a particular
plaintiff may feel.160 Some uses of religious symbols, such as the engraving of
“In God We Trust” on the currency, fall into a category of what
Professor Greenawalt calls “mild endorsement” that the Supreme Court—

156 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the Original
Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793, 1837 (2006) (“From the late
seventeenth century to the present, there is an unbroken tradition of legislatively enacted regulatory
exemptions. James Ryan, using a Lexis search and sampling techniques, estimated that there were
2000 religious exemptions on state and federal statute books in 1992.”).
157 See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1987) (upholding an exemption of religious organizations from a
prohibition against religious discrimination that resulted in an employee losing his job).
158 David Cole, Faith and Funding: Toward an Expressivist Model of the Establishment Clause, 75
S. C AL. L. REV. 559, 577 (2002) (“Religious division is renowned throughout history”).
159 Professor Feldman views such a right as lacking original historical support and traces its
origins to McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948). FELDMAN, supra note 47, at 50-53,
177-82. Nonetheless, Professor Feldman characterizes the views that support this right as the modern
“orthodoxy.” Id. at 201-03.
160 Steven G. Gey argues strongly that there are no trivial constitutional violations. “Under
God,” the Pledge of Allegiance, and Other Constitutional Trivia, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1865 (2003) (rejecting
a triviality defense used in the wake of the Ninth Circuit’s decision that the inclusion of “under
God” in the Pledge of Allegiance violated the Establishment Clause); see also Elk Grove Unified
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 36-37 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“There are
no de minimis violations of the Constitution—no constitutional harms so slight that the courts are
obliged to ignore them.”). Although this claim may be true, it is a different question whether a particular
provision of the Constitution confers judicially enforceable protection against a particular kind of
asserted injury that can be categorized as de minimis as a matter of law. Cf. Laycock, supra note 50, at
235 (“The de minimis exception makes sense as a prudential judgment not to pay the costs of absolutist
enforcement of an unpopular rule, but it is hard to make the line appear principled.”).
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whether for better or for worse—plainly regards the Constitution as
tolerating. 161
Nevertheless, as I emphasized above, Establishment Clause doctrine also
teaches that exhibitions of governmental support for religion violate
individual rights in some cases. Moreover, the violations are not restricted to
instances in which people are taxed to support a church or classified and
subjected to disfavored treatment on account of their religious beliefs. An
additional category comprises practices that have the practical effect of
stigmatizing or marginalizing particular individuals based on their status as
religious outsiders. The modern Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized as
much, including in its sometime reliance on an “objective observer” test
aimed at identifying practices that carry a message of outsider status to some
members of the sponsoring community.162 Establishment Clause interests
and values become implicated when, as Justice O’Connor put it in Lynch v.
Donnelly,163 governmental actions have the symbolic effect of “send[ing] a
message to nonadherents [of a favored religion] that they are outsiders.”164 In
sum, it is impossible to make sense of all of the decided cases without
recognizing that the Establishment Clause creates rights against
governmentally sponsored actions and displays that give rise to coercion,
stigmatization, or marginalization in matters involving governmentally
preferred religion. What is more, the values that would support recognition
of such rights are inherent in ideas of equal citizenship and religious
freedom.165
The fourth right that Part I implicitly identified—involving a right of
children not to be subjected to governmental endorsement of religion in the
coercive aspects of public school education, and of parents not to have their
children socialized into religious belief through governmental endorsement
of religion in the public schools—stands largely on its own bottom. The
general right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children, which is

161 See G REENAWALT , supra note 49, at 101. As Greenawalt summarizes, “factors [that] are
relevant” to the aptness of this characterization include “the inclusiveness of the view that is
endorsed, historical pedigree, [and] the brevity of references to religion.” Id.
162 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308-10 (2000); County. of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 631 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
163 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
164 Id. at 688.
165 Eisgruber and Sager ascribe to the Religion Clauses an “equal liberty” theory that forbids
governmental action that demeans anyone based on his or her religious commitments, but that
affirmatively protects religion only through a scheme of generally applicable rights that allow
religion to flourish without characterizing religious practice or belief as especially deserving of
solicitude. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 155, at 4-9.
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rooted in the Due Process Clause,166 forms a part of the picture. Nevertheless,
the Establishment Clause both generates independent rights in the children
themselves and sharpens and buttresses parental rights. As the Court said in
Engel v. Vitale, “the constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an
establishment of religion must at least mean that in this country it is no part
of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of
the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by
government.”167 In addition, children who are frequently coerced into public
school attendance should possess a right to be free of unwanted religious
proselytization, and thus of possible subtle pressures to assimilate to majority
norms, during school attendance and related activities.168
B. Aligning Standing and Merits Doctrine
Sound analysis under the Establishment Clause requires an
appreciation of how standing and substantive doctrine relate to one
another. In thinking about standing as about substantive constitutional
principles, analysis should begin with an appraisal of the rights or
interests that the Establishment Clause protects, whether to a greater or
a lesser degree. Some prominent commentators disagree. For example,
Professors Lupu and Tuttle maintain that the Establishment Clause is a
purely “structural,” as opposed to a rights-conferring, provision.169 This
characterization mistakes a genuine but partial insight for a categorical truth.
Sensibly interpreted in the light of case law and history, the Establishment
Clause has a structural aspect.170 It embodies a constitutional commitment to
166 See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (recognizing the “liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”).
167 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992) (“[O]ur
precedents do not permit school officials to assist in composing prayers as an incident to a formal
exercise for their students.”).
168 See id. at 594 (“Assuming, as we must, that the prayers were offensive to the student and
the parent who now object, the intrusion was both real and, in the context of a secondary school, a
violation of the objectors’ rights.”).
169 I RA C. L UPU & R OBERT W. T UTTLE , S ECULAR G OVERNMENT , R ELIGIOUS
P EOPLE 4-20 (2014); see Esbeck, supra note 36, at 3-4 (maintaining that “the Supreme Court’s
case law is more easily understood when the Establishment Clause is conceptualized as a
structural restraint on the government’s power to act on certain matters pertaining to religion”
than as a rights-conferring provision); see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1,
49 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (characterizing the Establishment Clause as a
“federalism” rather than a rights-conferring provision).
170 The structural aspect manifests itself, for example, in cases holding that civil courts lack the
competence to review whether church tribunals act in accord with church law or doctrine. See, e.g.,
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 721 (1976) (holding that civil courts
may not inquire whether religious governing bodies had power to decide religious disputes);
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94 (1952) (invalidating
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maintaining the separation of church and state for reasons that include the
healthy, autonomous functioning of churches as well as the desirability of a
secular government, not entangled in religious debates and jealousies.171 But
it implies no disparagement of the Establishment Clause’s structural features
to insist that the American constitutional tradition also recognizes the
Establishment Clause as a safeguard of individual rights.172
Indeed, if the Establishment Clause did not create individual rights, there
often would be no one with either standing or a cause of action to sue to
enforce its strictures. Although the Supreme Court sometimes distinguishes
between a plaintiff ’s standing and her legal authorization to bring suit, and
equates standing with injury,173 the Court normally insists that no one can sue
in federal court, even if she is injured, unless some valid source of law
authorizes her action.174 Almost invariably, moreover, legal authorization to
sue depends on the possession of a legal right.175 As the Supreme Court said
in the canonical case of Marbury v. Madison, “The province of the court is,
solely, to decide on the rights of individuals.”176
a New York statute that transferred power over Russian Orthodox churches from the churches’
Russian hierarchy to church authorities in the U.S).
171 See FELDMAN, supra note 47, at 24 (noting that for the founder of Providence Plantations,
Baptist theologian and preacher Roger Williams, the metaphorical wall of separation between church
and state that was later celebrated by Thomas Jefferson protected the “garden” of the church from
the “wilderness” of government).
172 See, e.g., CONKLE , supra note 50, at 154-55 (characterizing the Establishment Clause as
embodying both structural and rights-based values); Shiffrin, supra note 155 (emphasizing the
plurality of Establishment Clause purposes and values).
173 See, e.g., Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1970)
(“The ‘legal interest’ test goes to the merits. The question of standing is different. It concerns, apart
from the ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ test, the question whether the interest sought to be protected by the
complaint is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question.”).
174 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1383-84 (2015) (holding
that plaintiffs’ suit could not proceed because they lacked a cause of action under the Supremacy
Clause or any other source of authorizing law); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001)
(dismissing a suit in the absence of a statutorily authorized cause of action).
175 See Henry Paul Monaghan, Federal Statutory Review Under Section 1983 and the APA,
91 C OLUM . L. R EV. 233, 249-52 (1991) (distinguishing among “primary” rights, causes of action,
and remedial rights and describing the confluence that must exist for a party to have a right to sue).
176 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). The dependence of a party’s capacity to sue in federal
court on the existence of a right is most vividly illustrated in suits alleging constitutional violations
by state and local officials. For the most part, the authorization to bring such suits comes from
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), which requires plaintiffs to allege deprivation of constitutional “rights,
privileges, or immunities.” As the Supreme Court emphasized in Armstrong, a mere allegation that
state officials have violated the Supremacy Clause by failing to adhere to the dictates of federal law
will not give rise to a right to sue in federal court in the absence of an asserted violation of a federally
protected right, even if the suing party has unquestionably suffered injury and possesses Article III
standing. 135 S. Ct. at 1384; cf. Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV.
1435, 1448-52 (2013) (arguing that private parties lack rights under most structural constitutional
provisions and therefore should have no standing to complain of such provisions’ violation).
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Recognition that the Establishment Clause has both rights-creating and
structural aspects finds a close parallel in Article III: the Supreme Court has not
only acknowledged, but also emphasized, that Article III functions as both a
structural safeguard of judicial power and a guarantee of rights to individuals.177
We should think similarly about the Establishment Clause. Otherwise we would
need either to view the Establishment Clause as unenforceable through the
judicial process in many cases or to invent principles for standing that diverge
radically from those that govern the rest of constitutional law.178 No adequate
reason exists to embrace either of these options.
Once we recognize that the Establishment Clause creates rights in order
to protect a set of underlying interests such as those that subsection A.2 of
this Part picked out, the linkage between standing and merits issues becomes
unmistakable. The Supreme Court has held recurrently and insistently that
standing to sue depends on injury in fact.179 But whether a party has suffered

In Bond v. United States, which involved a challenge to a criminal conviction under state law, the
Supreme Court asserted that a party who satisfies Article III standing requirements can assert a
constitutional claim based on structural principles of constitutional federalism as long as the litigant
satisfies the Court’s “prudential” standing rules. 564 U.S. 211, 225-26 (2011). Normally, however,
prudential standing rules govern when one party can assert another’s rights, not structural principles
of constitutional law. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 45, at 161-68. Moreover, if Bond were
taken to establish that parties can routinely sue to enjoin governmental practices that violate purely
structural principles, its ruling would be hard to square with myriad cases holding that plaintiffs
cannot sue in federal court in the absence of a congressionally, constitutionally, or judicially
authorized cause of action. By contrast, the result in Bond could be easily explained as an application
of the longstanding principle that every actual or potential defendant in a criminal enforcement
proceeding “has a personal right not to be convicted under a constitutionally invalid law,” even if
the invalidity depends on structural constitutional norms. Bond, 564 U.S. at 226 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring). For elaboration and defense of the principle that defendants have a personal right not
to be subjected to judicial sanctions unless pursuant to constitutionally valid norms, see Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 133132 (2000) (“If the statute under which a defendant is convicted is invalid . . . the defendant’s
conviction must be reversed for the sole and simple reason that there is no constitutionally valid
rule of law under which the defendant could be sanctioned . . .”); Henry Paul Monaghan,
Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. C T. REV. 1, 3 (arguing that the Constitution forbids the imposition of
sanctions except pursuant to a valid rule of law).
177 See, e.g., Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1944 (2015) (affirming that
“[t]he entitlement to an Article III adjudicator is ‘a personal right’” but that it “also serves a
structural purpose” and therefore creates now-waivable limits on congressional power to transfer
jurisdiction to non-Article III tribunals); CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848-50 (1986) (“Article III
§1 serves both to protect the role of the independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of
the tripartite government and to safeguard litigants’ rights to have claims decided before judges who
are free from potential domination by other branches of government.” (internal citations omitted)).
178 Although those principles are themselves multifarious, the linkage among standing, rights,
and causes of action is a relative constant. See Fallon, Fragmentation, supra note 46, at 1070-80.
179 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.

96

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 166: 59

injury in the constitutional sense depends on the provision that she seeks to
enforce. The Supreme Court so recognized in Flast v. Cohen.180
Flast’s insight in linking the injuries that will support standing to the
substantive guarantees of a particular constitutional provision finds ample
corroboration in non–Establishment Clause cases.181 The equal protection
case of Heckler v. Mathews offers a potent analogy.182 In Heckler, a challenged
statute gave larger Social Security benefits to women than to men with
identical employment records.183 The statute further provided that if a court
should find the disparity unconstitutional, women’s benefits would fall to the
men’s level.184 Despite the inability of male plaintiffs to achieve any material
benefit from a ruling in their favor, the Court held that the mere denial of equal
treatment constituted a cognizable injury.185 In affirmative action cases, the Court
has similarly held that the denial to white plaintiffs of the opportunity to compete
for jobs or educational opportunities on a race-neutral basis constitutes an
actionable injury, even if those plaintiffs would not have received the jobs or
educational opportunities anyway.186 In these cases, as in Flast, the standing
analysis turns centrally on what the constitutional provision in question protects
against—and on the closely related question of whom the Constitution protects
against the kind of violation at issue.
In some areas of standing doctrine, the Supreme Court has expressed
skepticism of claims of injury shared by large numbers of the public.187 But
where many citizens all possess interests that a rights-conferring provision of

180 See 392 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1968) (upholding standing based on the historically central
Establishment Clause purpose of protecting taxpayers against being coerced to support religion).
181 See Fallon, Fragmentation, supra note 46, at 1070-80.
182 465 U.S. 728 (1984).
183 Id. at 732-33.
184 Id. at 734, 736-37.
185 Id. at 737 (holding the plaintiff retained standing despite the severability clause “because
the right asserted by appellee is the right to receive ‘benefits . . . distributed according to
classifications which do not without sufficient justification differentiate among covered [applicants]
solely on the basis of sex,’ and not a substantive right to any particular amount of benefits” (alteration
and omission in original) (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 647 (1975))); see also
Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1698-700 (2017) (reaffirming the holding of
Heckler v. Mathews that disparity of treatment constitutes actionable injury in cases alleging equal
protection violations).
186 See Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S.
656, 666 (1993); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 281 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
187 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755-56 (1984) (rejecting a claim of standing based
on stigmatic injury that would “extend nationwide to all members of the . . . racial groups” at issue);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (“[T]he Court has held that when the asserted harm is a
‘generalized grievance’ shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that
harm alone normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction.”); United States v. Richardson, 418
U.S. 166, 176-78 (1974) (describing the problems involved in finding standing for “plainly
undifferentiated” harms).
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the Constitution protects—as with the Fourteenth Amendment’s one-person,
one-vote principle,188 or the protections that the Establishment Clause affords
against being taxed to support a church189—the Court has recognized that the
broadly shared character of a right or interest does not disqualify it from
affording a basis for standing. Insofar as post-Flast cases involving standing
to enforce the Establishment Clause signal a retreat from that recognition,
they deserve to be rethought.
In sum, any suggestion that the Establishment Clause might violate
individual rights, but that no one would have standing to vindicate those
rights, would not identify a constitutional anomaly, but assert a constitutional
contradiction in terms. In United States v. Richardson,190 the Supreme Court
affirmed that there may be some provisions of the Constitution that literally
no one has standing to enforce. Richardson involved the Statement and
Account Clause, which requires Congress to provide regular accounts of
federal spending.191 Some have characterized this clause as not creating
individual rights.192 As I have argued, however, it is not plausible to make that
claim about the Establishment Clause.
Acknowledgment that the recognition of constitutional rights also implies
the existence of standing to enforce those rights does not entail that anyone
or everyone always has standing to sue to enforce the Establishment Clause,
any more than any other provision of the Constitution. Among other
considerations, although what counts as an injury for standing purposes
depends on the rights or interests that particular constitutional provisions
protect, the reciprocal relationship also holds: sound constitutional
interpretation may find no judicially enforceable constitutional rights in the
absence of plausible claims of individual injury.193 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court should recognize that infringements of constitutionally protected
interests under the Establishment Clause—such as those that I provisionally
identified in subsection A.2 of this Part—will normally support standing.

188 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962) (finding standing and distinguishing between
interests in voting without arbitrary impairment and interests in having the government act
according to law).
189 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1968).
190 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974).
191 See U.S. C ONST . art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“[A] regular statement and account of the receipts and
expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time.”).
192 See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 44, at 270 (“The Court’s decision in Richardson makes sense
only if the statement and account clause should be read not to permit a member of the body politic—
whether a federal taxpayer, a voter, or a citizen—to require, through judicial process, the production
of the CIA’s secret accounts.” (footnote omitted)).
193 Id. at 232 (acknowledging that “nature and degree of injury are critical issues in deciding
whether to provide legal protection”).
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Conversely, the absence of a judicially cognizable injury should often signal
that no constitutional violation has occurred.
III. APPLYING A TIERED-SCRUTINY FRAMEWORK ACROSS DIVERSE
CATEGORIES OF CASES
The burden of this Part is to demonstrate that the analytically sequenced,
tiered-scrutiny framework that I advocated in Part II would clarify
substantive issues and improve analysis in the categories of Establishment
Clause cases that Parts I and II outlined. My argument in this Part follows a
category-by-category approach, with careful attention to the varieties of cases
that arise within each.
Admittedly, the categories that structure my analysis partly overlap. Every
case involving financial support or accommodation for religion could also be
categorized as involving symbolic support: when the government provides
financial support, it signals its solicitude for religious institutions or
practitioners.194 Nevertheless, paradigmatic cases within the various categories
present sufficiently distinctive issues to merit separate discussion.195 Nor should
overlap lead to confusion. Constitutionally protected rights and interests are as
familiarly overlapping as they are diverse.196 With regard to any challenged law
or practice that might occupy multiple categories, we can always ask first whether
it violates constitutional tests applicable to financial support for or
accommodation of religion. If not, we can then ask, residually, whether forbidden
symbolic support for religion has occurred.

194 But see Andrew Koppelman, And I Don’t Care What It Is: Religious Neutrality in American
Law, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1115, 1121 (2013) (arguing that “the state can abstain from endorsing any
specification of the best or truest religion while treating religion as such, understood very abstractly,
as valuable” and thus “can accommodate religion as such while remaining religiously neutral”);
Laycock, supra note 156, at 1796 (finding “virtually no evidence” at the time of the Founding “that
anyone thought [religious accommodations] were constitutionally prohibited or that they were part
of an establishment of religion”).
195 Questions can also arise regarding possible overlap between the first two categories. For
example, one can dispute whether tax exemptions for religious institutions fall into the category of
financial support or that of accommodations. I argue below that the concept of accommodation
properly applies only to the lifting of regulatory burdens that specifically forbid or penalize
religiously required conduct or mandate religiously forbidden conduct. See infra notes 254–61.
196 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (discussing the “interlocking
nature” of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962)
(“Although [the Religion Clauses] may in certain instances overlap, they forbid two quite different
kinds of governmental encroachment upon religious freedom.”).
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A. Cases Involving Financial Aid to Religion
In cases involving nonincidental financial expenditures that benefit
churches or religious institutions,197 we need not tarry over the stage-one
inquiry into whether challenged statutes or programs come within the
Establishment Clause’s coverage and thus trigger some form of elevated
judicial scrutiny. In light of the general, background right of citizens not to
be taxed to support religion, the answer should be yes.
At the second stage, when a level of scrutiny needs to be determined, it will
prove helpful to distinguish cases involving provisions of benefits solely to
religious institutions from cases involving distributions to religious and
nonreligious institutions on a nondiscriminatory basis (as current doctrine does
already). In light of the historical foundations of the Establishment Clause, a tax
specifically levied for the support of a particular church would furnish the
paradigm case of constitutional impermissibility. Within a strict scrutiny
framework, it seems impossible to imagine any compelling governmental interest
that such a tax and expenditure scheme would be necessary to promote.198
Although no modern cases involve such blatant support for an
establishment of religion, statutes that provide material benefits exclusively
to religious entities remain close enough to the historically forbidden
paradigm to merit strict scrutiny. Though the cases are few, they generally
accord with this analysis and should be conceptualized as implicitly reflecting
it. Perhaps the closest modern decision is Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,199
which struck down sales tax exemptions for religious periodicals alone. The
so-called “parsonage exemption” from the federal income tax, which allows
clergy not to count the provision of a house or a housing allowance as taxable
income, should also be tested under, and should fail, strict scrutiny.200
Programs that distribute benefits to religious and nonreligious
organizations on a formally neutral basis have understandably proved more
197 Some government actions that are best thought of as symbolic support will inescapably involve
incidental costs. If the symbolic support is constitutionally impermissible for reasons unrelated to taxation
and financial support, any relevant action or practice should be invalidated for those reasons.
198 It is characteristic of strict scrutiny regimes to leave open the question whether there are
any extraordinary circumstances under which practices that are highly suspect might nevertheless
be justified. See supra note 18.
199 489 U.S. 1, 26 (1989).
200 For discussion and citations to literature espousing competing viewpoints, see
GREENAWALT, supra note 49, at 295-96 & n.70. For now, I put aside questions of who would or
should have standing to challenge the exemption. In doing so, I assume unapologetically that
conscientious legislators should not enact or reenact legislation that they know to be
unconstitutional, even if no one has standing to sue to challenge that legislation. See generally
Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms,
91 HARV. L. REV . 1212, 1227-28 (1978) (arguing that judicially underenforced constitutional norms
nevertheless impose obligations on nonjudicial actors).
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vexing and have recurrently divided liberals from conservatives. Such statutes
may have the effect of directing tax dollars into religious treasuries, but that
is not their sole consequence, nor is it necessarily their aim. Statutes that
distribute benefits to religious among other organizations are also familiar
and diverse: churches typically benefit on a neutral basis from police and fire
protection, street paving, snow removal, and a variety of other municipal
services. Under constitutional provisions other than the Establishment
Clause, the Supreme Court has often subjected statutes that have the
incidental effect but not the transparent purpose of substantially infringing
on constitutionally protected interests to elevated judicial tests, but ones less
exacting than strict scrutiny.201 In the case of programs that provide taxsupported material benefits to religious and nonreligious entities on a
nondiscriminatory basis, I would suggest the intermediate scrutiny formula
first articulated in Craig v. Boren.202 Under it, a statute will survive review if
it is substantially related to an important governmental interest.203
In controversial cases that have divided the Supreme Court, this form of
intermediate scrutiny would clarify central issues, not least by distinguishing
the questions of whether the government has important interests in providing
benefits to religious as well as secular organizations and of whether challenged
policies are sufficiently closely tailored to those interests. Consider, for
example, the programs in Mitchell and Zelman. The one in Mitchell promoted
an important governmental interest in ensuring effective education of
children who attend private, including parochial, as well as public schools.
Similarly, the voucher regime in Zelman contributed to the provision of
individual choice among diverse opportunities for effective education, also an
important governmental interest.204
Nevertheless, when we come, separately, to the “substantial relationship”
inquiry, courts should insist that governmental expenditures further secular
interests without gratuitously supporting religious activities, such as
expressly religious teaching. In light of this consideration, Justices O’Connor
and Breyer—who concurred in the judgment in Mitchell but did not join
Justice Thomas’s plurality opinion—rightly insisted that government

201 See Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV . L. R EV . 1175
(1996). Examples include incidental burdens on freedom of speech, see United States v. O’Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968), freedom of association, see Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign
Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 93-94 (1982), and on the right to vote, see Crawford v. Marion Cty.
Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189-91 (2008) (plurality opinion).
202 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
203 Id. at 197.
204 See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395 (1983) (“[A] State’s efforts to assist parents in meeting
the rising cost of educational expenses plainly serve[] [the] secular purpose of ensuring that the state’s
citizenry is well-educated” and lift a burden on “public schools . . . to the benefit of all taxpayers.”).
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resources that are provided directly to religious institutions should not be
diverted for use in teaching religious dogma.205 In this respect, current
doctrine is correct, and a tiered-scrutiny approach explains why: a program that
allowed such diversion would not be sufficiently substantially related to the
government’s justifying interest in providing effective secular education. By
contrast, provision of police and fire protection to churches on a
nondiscriminatory basis is substantially related to important governmental
interests in avoiding crime and conflagration. That fit extends to specifically
religious places and activities, even if some taxpayers would rather see churches
vandalized or burned to the ground than fund provision for their aid.
Voucher cases such as Zelman raise slightly different questions. On the
surface, the facilitation of private choice among effective educational
opportunities may constitute an important governmental interest in its own
right, partly independent of the interest in ensuring effective education to all
children. If so, a voucher program will look substantially related to the
interest in enabling private choice. Nevertheless, at least two questions may
arise within an intermediate scrutiny framework.
The first is whether a program should fail the substantial tailoring
requirement if a disproportionate number of beneficiaries enroll either in
religious schools generally or in the schools of a particular denomination.
Absent deliberate skews in administration, I would find intermediate scrutiny’s
tailoring requirement to be satisfied if a program straightforwardly promotes
educational diversity and private choice. Religion Clause jurisprudence once
pursued a more multifactored approach in appraising governmental support for
education in parochial schools and fell into near unintelligibility.206
Vouchers and similar aid to individuals can also present a second question,
involving whether the requirement of “substantially” close tailoring entails a
limitation of government subsidies to the dollar value of the secular benefits
that a program provides.207 In practice, most school voucher programs
probably fund less than the full costs of a private-school education. But the
question of an adequate secular return on governmental dollars expended
arose in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, which upheld
a vocational scholarship program that provided tuition aid to a blind student

205
206

See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 840 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 49, at 404 (noting that “[o]pinions of dissenting justices
and scholarly writings have expressed dismay over the arbitrariness of distinctions between what the
Court upheld and what it struck down” in school aid cases during the 1970s and early 1980s).
207 See Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CAL . L. R EV.
260, 265-66 (1968) (“[M]y proposal is that government financial aid may be extended directly or
indirectly to support parochial schools without violation of the establishment clause so long as such
aid does not exceed the value of the secular educational service rendered by the school.”).
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studying at a religious institution to become a pastor.208 Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills School District, which rejected a challenge to a funding program that
permitted sign-language interpreters to assist deaf children in religious
schools, presented a similar issue.209 These cases seem to me to have been
rightly decided based on the government interests involved. The funding in
Witters was substantially related to an important interest in providing
adequate assistance to blind students to pursue post-secondary education in
the fields and schools of their choice, on a basis that was not overtly hostile
to religion. A similar analysis should apply to cases involving veterans who
used the G.I. Bill to pursue religious education.210 Zobrest also seems to me to
involve a substantial government interest that goes beyond furnishing basic
secular education—one in providing deaf students with life opportunities
comparable to those of young people who are not hearing-impaired.
It is possible to imagine an ostensibly neutral scheme of voucher-type
funding that is not substantially tailored to an important governmental interest
in diversity or choice. A funding program might fail intermediate scrutiny if,
for example, a state or local government shut down its public schools or so
drastically underfunded them that it left parents with no practical choice but to
cash their vouchers at parochial schools. If so, intermediate judicial scrutiny
would better define the proper inquiry than the multifarious tests that judicial
liberals have proposed and that conservatives have eschewed.
I would similarly analyze programs under which governments provide
voucher-based funding for social services other than education.211 The hardest
cases involve situations in which religion is integral to the way in which a
service provider performs its mission—of treating drug or alcohol dependency,
for example.212 But in these cases as in those involving educational vouchers,
we need to consider whether the government has a substantial interest in
enabling private choice from among a menu of service providers. Often, I
believe, the answer should be yes, as it frequently is under current law. In cases
in which the funding occurs through vouchers, the reasoning that underlies
Witters (and some uses of the G.I. Bill) should control.

208
209
210
211

474 U.S. 481 (1986).
509 U.S. 1 (1993).
See GREENAWALT, supra note 49, at 408.
This, roughly, was the approach of Bowen v. Kendrick, which involved federal aid for
“educational services relating to family life and problems associated with adolescent premarital
sexual relations.” 487 U.S. 589, 594 (1988) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300z–1(a)(4) (1984)). Rejecting a
facial challenge, the Court remanded the case to the district court for a determination of whether
the statute was being improperly administered in ways that would include expenditures of money
expressly to promote religion. Id. at 620-21.
212 See, e.g., G REENAWALT , supra note 49, at 378.
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Contracting schemes under which the government directly funds
religiously affiliated service providers, such as programs to combat drug and
alcohol dependency, raise distinctive issues. On their faces, they seem less
closely tailored to facilitating private choice than voucher schemes. Under these
circumstances, the government should, at a minimum, bear a burden of showing
that “there are alternative secular providers of comparable quality available for
any citizen who objects to receiving services in a religious setting.”213
Tax exemptions pose yet further problems that a tiered-scrutiny
framework would also help to illuminate. As I have indicated, exemptions
exclusively for religious believers should elicit strict scrutiny that they almost
certainly could not survive.214 But the Supreme Court rightly noticed the
distinction between specifically targeted and more broadly based schemes of
exemption in Walz v. Tax Commission,215 which upheld an exemption for “real
or personal property used exclusively for religious, educational, or charitable
purposes.”216 Although the challenged statute required a classificatory
distinction between religious and nonreligious entities, when religious
organizations share their exemptions with a wide range of other charitable
institutions, there is a significant analogy to other cases in which material
benefits are distributed to religious and secular institutions on a
nondiscriminatory basis. Accordingly, and contrary to the Supreme Court’s
intimations in Walz, the most plausible justification for tax exemptions and
deductions that benefit churches would be that religious institutions, like a
variety of other nonprofit organizations, provide benefits that are cognizable
in secular terms.217 For this rationale to apply, the government should need to
afford comparable exemptions to some range of other nonprofit
organizations, though not necessarily to all.218
213 Cole, supra note 158, at 595-96. See generally Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, Sites of Redemption:
A Wide-Angle Look at Government Vouchers and Sectarian Service Providers, 18 J.L. & P OL. 539, 583
(2002) (emphasizing diversity and complexity in appraising government programs). Douglas
Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel raise the related issue that “[c]oncerns with complicity may lead not only
to the refusal to provide goods or services, but also to the refusal to provide information that would
lead the patient to obtain those goods or services elsewhere,” with the result that patients are
effectively “denied the opportunity to seek services from an alternative provider.” Conscience Wars:
Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2569-74 (2015).
214 See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
215 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970).
216 Id. at 666-67 (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. 16, § 1).
217 Although the Court took note of this characteristic function of churches, id. at 673 (“The
State has an affirmative policy that considers these groups as beneficial and stabilizing influences in
community life and finds this classification useful, desirable, and in the public interest.”), only Justice
Brennan relied on it. Id. at 687-89 (Brennan, J., concurring).
218 It should not, however, need to engage in monitoring to determine whether particular
churches advance these ends—an approach that would lead to an unhealthy entanglement between
the state and religion. Cf. id. at 674 (majority opinion) (“To give emphasis to so variable an aspect
of the work of religious bodies would introduce an element of governmental evaluation and
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It is also arguable that tax exemptions for churches, even if exclusive to
churches, might be narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest
in lifting burdens that impede the free exercise of religion. I shall discuss the
possibly compelling governmental interest in accommodating free exercise
below.219 But tax exemptions exclusively for churches would differ from other
burden-lifting statutes because of their distinctive similarity to the
historically forbidden paradigm of taxes exclusively to support religion.
Cases involving government expenditures to pay chaplains present
additional complications.220 Military chaplains raise one set of issues. The
government’s administration of the military is distinctive in many respects,
including under the Religion Clauses.221 When the government removes
people from the opportunities that they otherwise would have for religious
worship for periods of more than relatively brief duration, it acquires an
important interest in responding to and satisfying felt needs and preferences,
including religious preferences, that people who are so removed could not
satisfy otherwise.222 Absent denominational favoritism, provision for military
chaplains should therefore survive a form of intermediate scrutiny, crafted to
the distinctive needs of the military.
Paid legislative chaplains occupy a different category. If the issue were one
of first impression, I would conclude that expenditures to pay legislative
chaplains violate the Establishment Clause, historical practice
notwithstanding. The payment of legislative chaplains is not narrowly
tailored to a compelling interest or even substantially related to an important
secular interest. But the Supreme Court upheld the payment of legislative
chaplains, by a 6-3 vote, in Marsh v. Chambers.223 With Marsh now having
been decided, and in light of the support that historical practice provides for
standards as to the worth of particular social welfare programs, thus producing a kind of continuing
day-to-day relationship which the policy of neutrality seeks to minimize.”).
219 See infra notes 236–261 and accompanying text.
220 The leading Supreme Court case on chaplains is Marsh v. Chambers, which upheld payment
of legislative chaplains. 463 U.S. 783, 794 (1983). The Second Circuit similarly upheld the practice of
maintaining Army chaplains. Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985). For valuable discussion of
employment of military chaplains, including historical overviews and policy recommendations, see
GREENAWALT, supra note 49, at 207-20; and Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Instruments of
Accommodation: The Military Chaplaincy and the Constitution, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 89, 126-31 (2007).
Although these authors conclude that military chaplaincies are constitutionally permissible, they have
reservations about specific features of the current program. The payment of prison chaplains has less
of a historical pedigree and raises additional distinctive issues. See GREENAWALT, supra note 49, at 21920.
221 See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504, 510 (1986) (holding that the First
Amendment did not prohibit an Air Force regulation that prevented service members from wearing
yarmulkes while on duty and in uniform).
222 See GREENAWALT, supra note 49, at 208 (“The crucial premise in a defense of army
chaplains is that the military withdraws soldiers and sailors from ordinary life.”).
223 463 U.S. 783, 794 (1983).
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its conclusion,224 it seems to me a close question whether stare decisis should
now control. Even if so, in the absence of any significant secular justification
for paying legislative chaplains, it is hard to rationalize the non-neutral
expenditures to promote religion that paying chaplains from government
coffers entails.225 Accordingly, even if Marsh stands on its facts, the Court
should not accord that precedent any further, generative significance.226
B. Cases Involving Accommodation
The paradigmatic cases of governmental accommodation of religion that
Section I.B discussed all require classification based on religion for the purpose
of granting religious exemptions or preferences. In Amos, the Court held that
while “laws discriminating among religions are subject to strict scrutiny . . . laws
‘affording a uniform benefit to all religions’” should not be, if they are otherwise
acceptable under Lemon.227 As I have emphasized, however, religiously-based
classification and discrimination are highly dangerous,228 as is reflected in cases
grouping religion-based classifications with race-based classifications under the
Equal Protection Clause.229 Under the Establishment Clause as under other
constitutional provisions, a strict scrutiny framework would systematize an
appropriately wary judicial analysis.
Although all religious classifications should trigger strict scrutiny,
religiously-based exemptions from otherwise applicable regulatory duties and
prohibitions should sometimes (although surely not always) survive that test.
An analogy comes from the approach that the Supreme Court has adopted in
scrutinizing race-based affirmative action under the Equal Protection
Clause.230 The Court regards race-based classification as suspect, even when
224 Id. at 786-90.
225 See Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious Endorsements,
94 M INN. L. REV. 972, 1049 (2010) (arguing that “legislative prayer requires the government to

make” religious choices, each of which “marginalizes the religious segment that disagrees with it”
and “furthers religious division”).
226 This seems to be roughly the approach of Justice Kagan’s dissenting opinion in Town of
Greece v. Galloway. 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1841-42 (2014) (“The practice at issue here differs from the one
sustained in Marsh because Greece’s town meetings involve participation by ordinary citizens, and
the invocations given—directly to those citizens—were predominantly sectarian in content. Still
more, Greece’s Board did nothing to recognize religious diversity.”).
227 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987) (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982)).
228 See, e.g., Cole, supra note 158, at 577 (“Religious division is renowned throughout history,
from the Crusades to the Spanish Inquisition.”).
229 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
230 Just as one might think that preferences for racial minorities in university admissions
should be viewed as less suspect than policies of race-based exclusion, one might conclude that
accommodation statutes merit different analysis from laws that affirmatively exclude religious
minorities from benefits or opportunities. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes
About Equality, 96 C OLUM . L. REV. 1, 67-68 (1996) (“When whites act to the detriment of African
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implemented for non-invidious purposes, but not as categorically forbidden
in light of compelling governmental interests.231
The government’s compelling interest in creating religiously-based
exemptions from otherwise applicable obligations and prohibitions derives
from the Free Exercise Clause. In Employment Division v. Smith,232 the
Supreme Court interpreted the Free Exercise Clause exceedingly narrowly.
A number of prior cases had found that the Clause requires exemptions from
otherwise applicable statutory mandates that interfere with religious duties,
absent proof by the government that across-the-board enforcement is
necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.233 Rejecting that
approach, Smith ruled that the Free Exercise Clause does not require
exemptions from generally applicable legal obligations.234 As construed in
Smith, the Free Exercise Clause provides judicially enforceable protection
only against statutes that single out religiously motivated conduct for
disfavored treatment.235
Smith’s narrow framing of the Free Exercise Clause’s protective reach does
not define the outer limit of the government’s compelling interest in
accommodating religious practice. Much of the analysis in Smith depends on
the practical incapacity of the judiciary to develop a scheme of ad hoc

Americans, there is good reason for stepped-up judicial review. But when a majority acts to lift a
burden on a minority, regardless of the justification, there is no good reason for stepped-up judicial
review.”); Tseming Yang, Race, Religion, and Cultural Identity: Reconciling the Jurisprudence of Race and
Religion, 73 IND. L.J. 119, 179 (1997) (discussing the role of affirmative action and legislative
accommodations as “validat[ing] and affirm[ing] the importance and value of [an] individual’s sense
of self as equal to that of the majority members”). More in the case of religious preferences than of
race-based affirmative action, however, I think that any differences are best accounted for within a
strict scrutiny framework.
231 See supra note 18.
232 494 U.S. 872, 882, 888-90 (1990).
233 See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 141, 146 (1987); Thomas
v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718-19 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221, 235-36 (1972);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407-09 (1963).
234 494 U.S. at 878-79.
235 After Smith, the Court found such intentional singling out in a city ordinance banning
animal sacrifice that targeted practitioners of Santería in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah. 508 U.S. 520, 524 (1993). In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v.
EEOC, the Court unanimously distinguished Smith and found that the First Amendment required
a “ministerial exception” to otherwise generally applicable prohibitions against employment
discrimination. 132 S. Ct. 694, 706-07 (2012). In contrast with the statute in Smith, which “involved
governmental regulation of only outward physical acts,” the antidiscrimination statute threatened
“government interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the
church itself.” Id. at 707. For discussion of the relationship between Smith and Hosanna-Tabor and of
the many questions that the latter left open, see Michael W. McConnell, Reflections on HosannaTabor, 35 HARV. J.L. & P UB. P OL’Y 821 (2012).
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exemptions to generally applicable laws.236 If based substantially on the
practical difficulties of judicial enforcement, Smith converts the Free Exercise
Clause into a “judicially underenforced constitutional norm[].”237 When
Smith is so read, it should follow that Congress and the state legislatures have
important and even compelling interests in affording greater protection to
free exercise values than Smith mandates.238
If analysis of statutes that provide exceptions for religious objectors
proceeded pursuant to the strict scrutiny formula, and if the government has
a compelling interest in lifting burdens on the free exercise of religion, the
question of narrow tailoring would prove crucial. In cases under the Equal
Protection Clause, the Supreme Court has treated the narrow tailoring
inquiry as subsuming questions involving acceptable burdens on third
parties.239 It should do likewise under the Establishment Clause.240
Professors Lupu and Tuttle, among others, question why any third-party
burden should be acceptable.241 As they point out, accommodations that
benefit religious objectors but impose burdens on third parties bear
similarities to forbidden taxes exclusively to support religion. In that context,
they maintain, any tax burden, no matter how trifling, would result in
unconstitutionality. Although that conclusion is likely correct in any
practically imaginable instance, a strict scrutiny framework asks us to rethink
the grounds on which the judgment that a tax would be impermissible rests.
Under strict scrutiny, we would need to ask whether the government has a

236 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 888-89 (observing that a rule requiring judges to recognize
exemptions to generally applicable laws would “court[] anarchy”).
237 See Sager, supra note 200 at 1227 (distinguishing between fully enforced and underenforced
constitutional norms). Douglas Laycock and Luke W. Goodrich also find judicial underenforcement
of statutory mandates for religious exemptions, based on the belief of some courts, “as a matter of
institutional competence,” that “judges should not be in the business of drawing a line between
religious accommodations and government interests.” RLUIPA: Necessary, Modest, and UnderEnforced, 39 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 1021, 1053 (2012).
238 Cf. Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465,
1469 (1999) (proposing a “common-law exemption model” that would “let courts decide in the first
instance whether an exemption is to be granted” but allow legislative revision of the courts’ decisions).
239 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315-20 (1978) (opinion of Powell,
J.) (discussing burdens on third-party applicants as part of the tailoring analysis).
240 See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005) (recognizing, albeit not as an aspect
of a narrow tailoring inquiry, that religious exemptions must “take adequate account of the burdens
. . . impose[d] on nonbeneficiaries”).
241 See LUPU & T UTTLE , supra note 169, at 232-36. Frederick Mark Gedicks and
Rebecca G. Van Tassell argue that “the Establishment Clause precludes permissive accommodations
that shift the material costs of practicing a religion from the accommodated believers to those who
believe and practice differently,” because “forcing those who do not belong to a religion to bear the
material costs of practicing it is functionally equivalent to taxing nonadherents to support the
accommodated faith.” See RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional
Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. R EV. 343, 362-63 (2014).
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compelling interest in imposing a tax for the distinctive benefit of churches.
Virtually without exception, the answer will be no. Whether a statute that
lifts governmentally imposed burdens on religious institutions and practices
is narrowly tailored to a compelling interest in alleviating direct burdens on
the free exercise of religion is a different question.
In considering narrow tailoring and the permissibility of third-party
burdens, it may help to have concrete examples in view. One involves
Congress’s provision, via the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), of
exemptions from the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) mandate to employers to
provide their employees with health insurance coverage that includes
contraception.242 Under RFRA, the government must exempt religious
objectors whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by a regulation
unless it can demonstrate that refusing an exemption is “the least restrictive”
means of promoting a “compelling” interest.243 Another currently debated
issue arises from state statutes that exempt religious objectors from state-law
antidiscrimination rules, including provisions that otherwise would require
service providers to furnish services for same-sex marriage celebrations.244

242 See Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 241, at 350 (noting that the ACA mandate provides
an example of cost shifting to nonadherents).
243 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012). Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014),
held that some for-profit corporations can qualify as “persons” entitled to religious exemptions
under RFRA. The scope of required accommodations remained in doubt, however, after Zubik v.
Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016), vacated and remanded a court of appeals’ decision without squarely
resolving disputed issues. On October 6, 2017, the Trump Administration issued interim final rules
allowing employers to decline to provide contraception coverage based on either a religious or a
moral objection. See Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain
Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,792 (Oct. 13, 2017) (to be
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, and 45 C.F.R. pt. 147) (concerning religious
exemptions); Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services
Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,838 (Oct. 13, 2017) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt.
54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, and 45 C.F.R. pt. 147) (moral exemptions). Various parties immediately filed
suit to challenge the validity of the new regulations under the Establishment Clause as well as the
Administrative Procedure Act and the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection mandate. See Robert
Pear et al., Trump Administration Rolls Back Birth Control Mandate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/us/politics/trump-contraception-birth-control.html
[https://perma.cc/UJY2-JB6Q] (describing lawsuits by Massachusetts and California); see also Ema
O’Connor, The Trump Administration is Already Facing Several Lawsuits over its New Birth Control
Rules, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.buzzfeed.com/emaoconnor/four-groups-havealready-said-theyll-sue-the-trump [https://perma.cc/G7E4-LZEA] (describing additional lawsuits
by Washington, Pennsylvania, the ACLU, the Center for Reproductive Rights, and others).
244 See, e.g., Christopher C. Lund, Keeping Hobby Lobby in Perspective, in THE RISE OF
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 285-89, 303-04 (Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders, and Zoë
Robinson eds., 2016) (discussing such claims by religiously objecting photographers and florists);
Andrew Koppelman, A Zombie in the Supreme Court: The Elane Photography Cert Denial,
7 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 77, 78-79 (2015) (discussing a case involving potential conflict between
religious liberty and gay rights).
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In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints v. Amos, the Court upheld an exemption from Title VII’s
antidiscrimination requirements that resulted in an employee losing his
job.245 Amos, however, possesses only limited relevance to most questions
arising under RFRA and parallel state statutes. Amos involved a compelling
interest in avoiding governmental interference in the religion-based choices
made by religious organizations in the conduct of nonprofit, religiously
inflected activities.246 In Amos, the religiously inflected nature of the
discharged employee’s work as a janitor might reasonably be questioned. But
if we credit the government’s interest in being able to draw a clean line that
groups all employees of religious organizations’ nonprofit affiliates into a
single category, then imposing the loss of a job on a third party may
reasonably count as narrowly tailored to a compelling interest in avoiding
interference with the internal structure and operations of churches and
closely affiliated charitable institutions.247 By contrast, the demand for narrow
tailoring appropriately bites more sharply when the government asks one
citizen to suffer a burden in order to facilitate another citizen’s personal
religious practice. Consistent with this distinction, the Court held in Estate
of Thornton v. Caldor,248 and more recently reaffirmed in Cutter v. Wilkinson,
that excessively large burdens on third parties can result in constitutional
invalidity under the Establishment Clause.249
245
246

483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987).
Id. at 335-36. Douglas NeJaime catalogues state antidiscrimination laws that “permit
religious employers to use religion as a factor in employment, but . . . limit the use of religion to
employment positions that concern the religious purpose of the organization.” Marriage Inequality:
Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Exemptions, and the Production of Sexual Orientation Discrimination,
100 C AL. L. REV. 1169, 1193 (2012).
247 The Supreme Court more recently identified a constitutional imperative of noninterference in some aspects of the internal structure of religious organizations in Hosanna-Tabor.
See supra text accompanying note 235.
248 472 U.S. 703, 708-09 (1985).
249 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005). Although I have emphasized the need for the government to
justify religious exemptions as necessary to promote a compelling interest under the Establishment
Clause, RFRA appears on the surface to reverse the compelling-interest inquiry: it provides
exemptions for religious objectors unless the government can demonstrate a compelling interest in
denying an exemption. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(b) (2012) (requiring “the least restrictive” means
of promoting a “compelling” interest). Against the background of Establishment Clause concerns
that religious exemptions should not impose excessive burdens on non-beneficiaries, however, the
statute’s denial of religious exemptions pursuant to a compelling-interest test serves a
constitutionally necessary function. Whether or not Congress so intended, we should view the
government as having a compelling interest in avoiding the imposition of constitutionally excessive
burdens on third parties. In other words, courts should conduct RFRA-based analysis into whether
denying exemptions to religious objectors is narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest
in a way that ensures that RFRA does not overstep the bounds of constitutional permissibility, and
violate the Establishment Clause, by imposing unreasonably large burdens on third parties in its
application to particular cases. See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Exemptions, Third-Party Harms,

110

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 166: 59

Although tiered scrutiny and the distinction between compelling-interest
and narrow-tailoring inquiries would importantly advance analysis of
acceptable third-party burdens, any ultimate resolution of the contested
issues requires normative judgment. For my own part, I would reject the view
that no burdens are permissible, or even that no burden may be more than
“de minimis.”250 In particular, I would conclude that the burdens imposed by
exemptions from otherwise applicable state antidiscrimination laws are not
unreasonable, and are therefore constitutionally acceptable, when alternative
providers of services or opportunities are readily available. Exemptions from
antidiscrimination mandates can undoubtedly carry negative expressive
connotations and empower stigmatization along lines of historic oppression
and continuing dignitary vulnerability—for example, when photographers or
caterers claim religious exemptions from obligations to provide services in
connection with same-sex weddings.251 I do not mean to trivialize the
significance of such actions. But I would hesitate to conclude that any
cognizable burden on third-party interests disables the legislature from
creating new rights—for example, to health care coverage or to nondiscrimination by private providers of services—and, at the same time,
making accommodations to alleviate burdens on freedom of religious
exercise.252 Accordingly, while I would deem categorical exemptions
impermissible, I would uphold exemptions where alternative services or
opportunities are reasonably available.253
and the Establishment Clause, 91 NOTRE D AME L. REV. 1375, 1383 (2016) (“Accommodations
required by RFRA by definition will not violate the Establishment Clause, because any religious
accommodation that would violate the Establishment Clause will not be required by RFRA in the
first place.”). But see Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 241, at 363, 373 (arguing that any “significant”
or “substantial” burden would violate the Establishment Clause and that RFRA is therefore
vulnerable to as-applied challenges).
250 In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison the Supreme Court construed the Title VII mandate
that employers provide “reasonable accommodation” of their employees’ religious beliefs as not
requiring them to bear more than “de minimis cost.” 432 U.S. 63, 81, 84 (1977).
251 See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Moving Targets: Obergefell, Hobby Lobby, and the Future of LGBT Rights,
7 ALA. C.R. & C.L. REV. 1, 67 (2015) (noting the political symbolism of a “license to discriminate.”).
252 Compare Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation: Contraception, Abortion,
Same-Sex Marriage, and Other Clashes Between Religion and the State, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1417, 1429 (2012)
(arguing that religious exemptions are in the interest of all sides in debates on contentious social
issues including same-sex marriage and contraception), with Shannon Gilreath, Not A Moral Issue:
Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 205, 206 (2010) (book review)
(rejecting purported compromises as insufficiently respectful of the countervailing third-party
interests at stake). Andrew Koppelman argues for a middle position under which religiously owned
“[b]usinesses that serve the public, such as wedding photographers, should be exempted” from
antidiscrimination laws, “but only if they are willing to bear the cost of publicly identifying
themselves as discriminatory.” Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and the Purposes of
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619, 620 (2015).
253 Cf. Nelson Tebbe, Micah Schwartzman, & Richard Schragger, How Much May Religious
Accommodations Burden Others?, in LAW, RELIGION, AND HEALTH IN AMERICA (forthcoming 2017)
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So far I have suggested that the government has a compelling interest in
lifting governmentally imposed burdens on religiously motivated conduct.
Sometimes, however, the term “accommodation” is used more broadly.
Perhaps most importantly, state and federal statutes sometimes require
private parties to accommodate the religious beliefs of their employees or
clientele. To take the most prominent example, Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act requires private employers to provide reasonable accommodations
of the religious practices of employees unless doing so would impose undue
hardship.254 The state of Connecticut established a more stringent
accommodation requirement through the statute that the Supreme Court
invalidated in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor.255 Although I have referred to cases
arising under such statutes in discussing when burdens on third parties violate
the Establishment Clause, federal statutes that mandate accommodations by
private firms—centrally including Title VII—raise a threshold issue of
congressional authority that statutes lifting federally imposed burdens do not.
Here, a tiered-scrutiny regime usefully presses us to consider exactly what
the government’s interest in mandating private accommodations is and how
weighty it should be adjudged. As a general matter, the government has no
legitimate, much less a compelling, interest in directing private entities to treat
religious believers more generously than they treat others. The mandate of the
Free Exercise Clause does not extend to non-governmental actors. Accordingly,
the Court cannot derive a compelling interest in forcing private parties to grant
religious exemptions from a judicially underenforced Free Exercise Clause. If
not, the question becomes whether the government has another, compelling
interest in requiring private actors to bear the costs of burdensome religious
accommodations that necessarily employ religion-based classifications.
With this question clearly framed, the foundation for permissible
governmental mandates of private accommodation that require religion-based
classification must lie in the first instance in equality-based or antidiscrimination
norms.256 Unfortunately, the line between prohibitions against religious

(arguing for the adoption of Title VII’s “undue hardship” standard to weigh the permissibility of
burdens on third parties).
254 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e–2(a)(1) (2012).
255 472 U.S. 703, 709-10 (1985) (invalidating a Connecticut mandate “that those who observe a
Sabbath any day of the week as a matter of religious conviction must be relieved of the duty to work on
that day, no matter what burden or inconvenience this imposes on the employer or fellow workers”).
256 See Esbeck, supra note 17, at 386-87 (characterizing Title VII and similar federal
accommodation mandates as “prohibiting religious discrimination” and as “being pro-religious
freedom, which the Establishment Clause permits, as distinct from being pro-religion, which the
clause disallows”); cf. Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S. at 81 (“The repeated, unequivocal emphasis of
both the language and the legislative history of Title VII is on eliminating discrimination in
employment . . . . It would be anomalous to conclude that by ‘reasonable accommodation’ Congress
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discrimination, on the one hand, and mandated accommodations of religious
beliefs and practices, on the other, can frequently prove elusive.257 Among other
things, most employers’ pre-existing work rules will likely reflect the
assumptions, values, or preferences of those with relatively mainstream
religious practices. Accordingly, although accommodation mandates that
require explicitly religion-based classification should trigger strict scrutiny, I
believe that some such mandates advance a compelling government interest,
which Justice O’Connor once characterized as “assuring employment
opportunity to all groups in our pluralistic society.”258 Moreover, statutes
(such as Title VII) that require only reasonable accommodations and thereby
limit the burdens that they impose on third parties should satisfy strict
scrutiny’s narrow tailoring requirement.
Proponents of other kinds of statutes and policies that benefit religion
sometimes also claim the mantle of “accommodation.”259 A familiar example
involves prayers on public occasions: supporters sometimes defend them as
accommodations for people who want to pray.260 This argument attempts to
press the concept of accommodation, as it currently figures in Establishment
Clause doctrine, too far. Cutter v. Wilkinson appropriately took care to limit
its analysis to cases involving the lifting or relaxation of regulations or
requirements—especially those that the government imposes directly.261
C. Symbolic Support Cases
In thinking about symbolic support cases, we should begin at stage one
of a scheme of sequenced, tiered scrutiny by asking which policies,
statutes, and activities sufficiently impinge on interests that the
Establishment Clause protects to call for any form of elevated scrutiny. I
foreshadowed my own conclusions in Section II.A. There I described
modern doctrine as recognizing a right not to be symbolically demeaned
or marginalized by governmental endorsement of religion, and not to be
coerced into participating in a religious exercise. But Section II.A did not
meant that an employer must deny the shift and job preference of some employees, as well as deprive
them of their contractual rights, in order to accommodate or prefer the religious needs of others.”).
257 See generally Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 H ARV . L. R EV . 642,
645 (2001) (arguing that “some aspects of antidiscrimination law . . . are in fact requirements of
accommodation” and that other aspects of antidiscrimination law are more similar to accommodation
mandates than is generally acknowledged).
258 Caldor, 472 U.S. at 712 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
259 See generally GREENAWALT, supra note 49, at 336-51 (discussing the limits of the concept of
accommodation).
260 See, e.g., County. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659-61 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that a public display of a crèche and a menorah
during holiday season constituted a recognition or accommodation of citizens’ religious beliefs).
261 544 U.S. 709, 720-24 (2005).
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identify any more general, freestanding right or interest in having the
government maintain strict neutrality (in any plausible sense of that term)
in expression regarding religion.
If it were left to me to write a Constitution and then develop doctrine to
implement it, I would insist on broader safeguards against symbolic
governmental support for religion than exist under the Constitution and
implementing doctrine that we now have. But I have no such prerogative. In light
of historical practice, including longstanding judicial failure to uproot many
instances of symbolic support for religion, some of which trace nearly to the
nation’s founding, we should acknowledge that symbolic expressions such as “In
God We Trust” on the currency and declarations of national days of prayer and
Thanksgiving do not violate any judicially cognizable individual rights.
When entrenched practices are morally odious—as, for example, were
those at issue in Brown v. Board of Education,262 which mandated an end to
racial discrimination in the public schools, and Loving v. Virginia,263 which
invalidated state antimiscegenation law—long history should not prevent
their rejection by the courts. Moral judgment is therefore inescapable in
Establishment Clause cases on roughly the same terms as under other
constitutional provisions, including the Equal Protection Clause.264 Looking
backward, I believe that the effect of school prayer and Bible-reading in
marking non-Christians and even some Christians, including Catholics, as
disfavored outsiders justified the Court’s decisions invalidating those
practices in Engel v. Vitale265 and School District of Abington Township v.
Schempp,266 especially in light of accreting foundations for those decisions in
judicial precedent.
But “mild endorsements” 267 outside the context of the public schools do
not, in my judgment, raise issues of comparable moral and constitutional
urgency. Taking the acceptability of such endorsements as settled by history,
yet seeking to define and rationalize the limits that modern doctrine has
imposed, I would urge a threshold test under which symbolic governmental
support for religion provokes no special demand for justification under the
Establishment Clause unless a law, practice, or display has significant,
modern-day effects in promoting religion or stigmatizing religious outsiders.
262
263

347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”).
388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (“Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry, a
person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”).
264 See generally David L. Shapiro, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Adjudication: An
Introspection, 86 TEX. L. REV. 929, 945 (2008) (discussing when judges and Justices should accept
the authority of precedents that they believe to have been wrongly decided in the first instance).
265 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
266 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
267 See G REENAWALT , supra note 49, at 101.
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Admittedly, determining when legislation has significant effects in promoting
religion or stigmatizing or demeaning religious minorities would pose
delicate problems. But such problems appear unavoidable unless the Supreme
Court is prepared either to invalidate all legislation that has the predominant
purpose of promoting religion, at one extreme, or to approve all religionpromoting legislation that is not overtly coercive, at the other.268
Within the Supreme Court’s cases to date, the most sensitive effort to
identify legally significant harms that result from the expressive impact of
symbolic support for religion has come from the “objective observer”
framework that Justice O’Connor developed. Justice O’Connor offered
alternative formulations of her proposed test. The most apt, in my view,
probes whether a challenged practice or statute conveys an implicit message
disapproving some citizens’ beliefs and thus stigmatizing them as outsiders
to the political community.269 In pursuing a similar but not identical inquiry,
Professor Greenawalt points to “the inclusiveness of the view that is
endorsed, historical pedigree, [and] the brevity of references to religion” as
considerations that matter to judicial inquiry.270 In seeking to rationalize the
main outlines of a body of doctrine that does not conform perfectly to
anyone’s normative ideals, but that aims at compromise where I believe that
compromise is vital, I, too, would take those considerations into account.
Justice O’Connor’s objective observer test has drawn wide criticism as too
subjective.271 This is an undoubted problem, which can be only partly
alleviated by specifying that the relevant perspective is that of a reasonable

268 Cf. County. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“Our cases disclose two limiting principles:
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise; and it
may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give direct benefits to religion in
such a degree that it in fact ‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.’”
(quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984))).
269 Id. at 631 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The question
under endorsement analysis . . . is whether a reasonable observer would view” a challenged practice
or statute as expressing “disapproval of his or her particular religious choices.”). As Justice O’Connor
put it in Lynch, “Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents [of a favored religion] that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents
that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.” 465 U.S. at 687-88.
270 G REENAWALT , supra note 49, at 101.
271 See, e.g., County. of Allegheny, 492 at 675-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part) (arguing the test lends itself to a subjective inquiry); Jesse H. Choper,
The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J. L. & P OL. 499, 510-12 (2002) (discussing the
lack of clarity provided by the court regarding the “Reasonable Observer” test); Steven D. Smith,
Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test,
86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 267 (1987) (arguing that Justice O’Connor’s “no endorsement” test would
introduce more “ambiguities and analytical deficiencies” into the doctrine); see also KOPPELMAN,
supra note 20, at 45-77 (criticizing the test but then advocating adoption of it in a “modified” form).
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religious outsider.272 In weighing the proper legal conclusion, we should not
question the good faith of those who claim to experience marginalization or
stigmatization from the presence of “In God We Trust” on the currency, for
example.273 The requisite judgments are legal, informed but not determined by
psychological facts.274 For what it is worth, I would agree with most, but not all,
of Justice O’Connor’s controversial judgments—for example, that holiday
displays with religious components may frequently convey no religiously
marginalizing message, but that standalone crèches typically would.275
As Justice Scalia warned, predicating judicial analysis on disputable
assessments of stigma and marginalization could imaginably “inflame
religious passions by” inviting “endless litigation.”276 But a few guideposts
should alleviate worries about uncertainty in many cases. If statutes’
expressive effects should instigate elevated judicial scrutiny when they
substantially marginalize or stigmatize nonadherents to a favored creed, then
a distinction between newly enacted and older statutes should often prove
decisive.277 Overall, the Supreme Court has exhibited a greater toleration for
long-ensconced practices that symbolically support religion—such as
inscribing “In God We Trust” on the currency—than for newly initiated
272 See Caroline Mala Corbin, Ceremonial Deism and the Reasonable Religious Outsider,
57 UCLA L. REV . 1545, 1574 (2010) (calling for a “reasonable religious outsider’s perspective” in
evaluating the constitutionality of ceremonial deism); Developments in the Law—Religion and the
State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1648 (1987) (“If the establishment clause is to prohibit [the]
government from sending the message to religious minorities or nonadherents that the state favors
certain beliefs and that as nonadherents they are not fully members of the political community, its
application must turn on the message received by the minority or nonadherent.”).
273 Cf. Shiffrin, supra note 155, at 67 (arguing that “the children of atheists, agnostics, and
Buddhists to name a few, are . . . overwhelmingly likely to think that” recitations of the Pledge of
Allegiance mark them as “outsiders, not full members of the political community,” even though
Justice O’Connor concluded otherwise).
274 See B. Jessie Hill, Anatomy of the Reasonable Observer, 79 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1407,
1409-10 (2014) (arguing that the reasonable observer framework does not “capture the way real
people actually view a religious display” but instead should be understood as “an accurate
model for making sense of the process of interpreting social meaning”). For a perceptive
discussion of analogous issues under the Equal Protection Clause, see D EBORAH HELLMAN,
WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 59-85 (2008).
275 See County. of Allegheny, 492 at 624-27 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (concluding that “placement of the central religious symbol of the Christmas holiday
season at the Allegheny County Courthouse has the unconstitutional effect of conveying a
government endorsement of Christianity”).
276 McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 908 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
277 Cf. Douglas Laycock, Government-Sponsored Religious Displays: Transparent Rationalizations and
Expedient Post-Modernism, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1211, 1251-52 (2011) (“Even a Court composed of
nine aggressive secular liberals would not order the demolition or sandblasting of every religious symbol
on any government property in America . . . . If the Court is determined to permit some longstanding
religious displays to remain just because they have been there a long time, it would do better to
announce a rule explicitly about time—a grandfather clause, a statute of limitations, or a laches bar—
rather than absurdly trying to secularize symbols that are plainly religious.”).
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practices, such as the introduction of displays of the Ten Commandments in
public buildings.278 In my view, the expressive effects of legislation in
supporting religion or marginalizing religious minorities are frequently
greater at the time of the legislature’s initial action than when original
purposes are widely forgotten. The Court’s analysis in McGowan v.
Maryland,279 which upheld the constitutionality of a set of Maryland statutes
that barred many retail establishments from opening on Sunday, is instructive
in this respect. The Court acknowledged that the legislature that originally
enacted at least one of the challenged laws had a purpose, and presumably
achieved the effect, of promoting religion.280 But the Court concluded that
such provisions had a “present purpose and effect” that stood “wholly apart
from their original purposes or connotations”—one of “provid[ing] a uniform
day of rest for all citizens.”281 In other words, the challenged statutes had
ceased to communicate a message that marked some citizens as outsiders to
the community’s approved religious practices.
Recognizing that the expressive effects of religion-supporting practices
can diminish over time makes sense of the Court’s failure to require the
chiseling out of religious symbols and exercises (such as “In God We Trust”
on the currency and possibly legislative prayer) that it should not allow to be
initiated today.282 I also think it fair to say—however harsh it will sound in
some ears—that the reasonable observer that we can construct or reconstruct
from the case law sometimes requires religious minorities or outsiders to
accept or acclimatize themselves to practices that are now largely woven into
the culture and that convey no fresh, marginalizing message delivered by
modern political decisionmakers. I do not, however, exclude the possibility
that the expressively stigmatizing effects of a statute might grow, rather than
recede, over time.283
278
279
280

See, e.g., McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859 (2005).
366 U.S. 420 (1961).
See id. at 431 (“There is no dispute that the original laws which dealt with Sunday labor
were motivated by religious forces. But what we must decide is whether present Sunday legislation,
having undergone extensive changes from the earliest forms, still retains its religious character.”).
281 Id. at 445.
282 This, roughly, is what I take to be the approach of Justice Breyer’s controlling concurring
opinion in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 699 (2005). See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Salute to Justice
Breyer’s Concurring Opinion in Van Orden v. Perry, 128 HARV. L. REV. 429, 431-33 (2014) (arguing
Justice Breyer’s concurrence “suggests a narrow prescription that embodies pragmatic good sense”);
see also Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 303-04 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (noting that some practices that “no longer have a religious purpose or meaning” might
be “insulate[d]” from judicial scrutiny).
283 A possible example may lie in school prayer. According to Michael J. Klarman, “Under the
‘Protestant consensus’ that was dominant until at least the late nineteenth century—in many places
much longer—public school displays of (Protestant) religiosity, such as prayer, Bible reading (from
the King James, not the Douay, Bible), and religious hymn singing were unobjectionable on the
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If a statute or policy—such as one of sectarian public prayer—has
significant religiously marginalizing effects, then strict judicial scrutiny ought
to apply. Once the threshold that triggers elevated scrutiny is crossed, the
government has no substantial interest in facilitating religious exercise by, for
example, organizing public prayers. Under these premises, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Town of Greece v. Galloway to uphold a town government
body’s practice of commencing its sessions with often-sectarian prayers seems
to me to have been mistaken. The Court erred, first in failing to see the need
for an elevated standard of judicial review and then in failing to invalidate a
practice that could not possibly have satisfied strict scrutiny.
D. Religion in the Public Schools
In finding that the government violates the Establishment Clause by
offering endorsements of religion within the public schools, the Supreme
Court has not insisted on evidence of coercion (beyond the coercive pressure
to attend public schools) or religious stigmatization. But if the Court
renounces the position that a religious purpose can violate the Establishment
Clause even in the absence of significant religious effects—as I have argued
that it should—then it needs to formulate a threshold standard to signal the
need for strict judicial scrutiny. Largely consistent with the case law to date,
the operative question in cases challenging religious displays and practices in
the public schools should be whether a reasonable observer would perceive
governmental endorsement of religion.284
So recognizing would call for a reconceptualization of some leading cases,
but not necessarily for a change of result in many of them. If endorsement
became the touchstone in cases involving religion in the public schools,
statutes requiring school prayers would register as suspect, but provision for
moments of silence ordinarily would not. In Wallace v. Jaffree, plaintiffs
successfully challenged a statute authorizing a moment of silence “for
meditation or voluntary prayer” that the Alabama legislature enacted to
supplant a prior statute that already permitted schools to observe a daily

ground that the United States was a ‘Christian nation.’” Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 47 (1996). Professor Klarman suggests that it was not until the societal
changes wrought by mass immigration of religious minorities (Catholics and Jews in particular) that
the popular “connot[ation]” of church-state separation changed to render these practices
objectionable and oppressive. Id. at 47-49.
284 Although a forbidden legislative intent should not constitute a per se Establishment Clause
violation, evidence that the legislature acted with a forbidden intent could play an indirect role in
constitutional analysis, as evidence that would inform a reasonable observer’s perception or nonperception of a governmental endorsement of religion. Cf. Fallon, supra note 13, at 585 (noting that
legislators’ known intentions can contribute to a statute’s expressive effects).
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moment of silence “for meditation.”285 Under the circumstances, the second
moment-of-silence statute conveyed a message of endorsement.
In Edwards v. Aguillard, the Supreme Court invalidated a statute
providing that if public school teachers taught evolution, they must also
present the alternative theory of “creation science.”286 Justice Brennan’s Court
opinion rested on the ground that the statute had a forbidden purpose of
promoting religion.287 The Court should have asked instead whether the
statute, as viewed through the eyes of an objective observer, conveyed a
message of endorsement. Although that question seems to me to be an
arguable one, I believe that the Court reached the correct result.
If endorsement exists, then strict scrutiny should apply. We could still ask
whether the endorsement is necessary to promote a compelling governmental
interest. But it is hard to imagine cases in which endorsing religion in the
public schools would satisfy that test.
E. Concluding Methodological Note: The Establishment Clause in Context
The views that I have expressed in this Part will frustrate many
Establishment Clause conservatives and Establishment Clause liberals
alike—and especially those who train their attention on the Establishment
Clause in relative abstraction from the remainder of constitutional law.
Before concluding this Part, I should offer a response.
The proper judicial role under the Establishment Clause almost
necessarily requires the integration of Religion Clause theory with more
general constitutional theory. Many conservatives maintain that the Supreme
Court should revamp Establishment Clause doctrine pursuant to
predominantly if not exclusively originalist premises.288 As I have recognized,
original meanings matter to constitutional law. But they should not matter
more to the Establishment Clause than to federalism or separation-of-powers
doctrine, the Free Speech Clause, or the Equal Protection Clause.289 Anyone
285
286
287

472 U.S. 38, 58-59 (1985).
482 U.S. 578, 581 (1987).
See id. at 594 (“Becuase the primary purpose of the Creationsim Act is to endorse a
particular religious doctrine, the Act furthers religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.”).
288 See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92-104 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that Establishment
Clause jurisprudence was built upon a “mistaken understanding of constitutional history”);
see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in
the judgment) (arguing prior Establishment Clause cases were wrongly decided because they
departed from the original enacting intent of the Clause).
289 See D AVID S TRAUSS , T HE L IVING CONSTITUTION 12-18 (2010) (arguing that “if
originalism were to prevail,” racially segregated public schooling would be permitted, the
government could discriminate against women, “[t]he Bill of Rights would not apply to the states,”
states could violate “one-person, one-vote” principles, and “[m]any federal labor, environmental, and
consumer protection laws would be unconstitutional”).
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who believes that the Court should set aside more than a half-century of
precedent and the values that underlie it should have to explain why practice
and precedent matter less in Establishment Clause than in other
constitutional cases. Especially given the contestability of historical
understandings,290 I see no adequate reason.
My analysis and conclusions will also have disappointed, and possibly
outraged, those liberals who advance a normative vision of the Establishment
Clause that would forbid any material or symbolic support for religion
whatsoever. My response and challenge to them partly track what I have said
in response to those constitutional originalists who would accord no weight
to longstanding practice and precedent. Yes, we can imagine the Supreme
Court ordering the removal of “In God We Trust” from the currency and
forbidding all religious displays in public places. But anyone disposed to
demand the uprooting of these practices should also think carefully about how
such a stance would relate to principles of stare decisis and judicial restraint
that govern, or should govern, in the rest of constitutional law.291 If
confronted with a partly analogous situation in which judicial conservatives
prepared to overturn longstanding practices of congressional economic
regulation under the Commerce Clause, most liberals would, I suspect, recoil
with horror at what they would characterize as intolerable judicial activism.
To summarize: As I have emphasized repeatedly in calling for a wide-angle
appraisal of Establishment Clause doctrine, it is a deep if familiar mistake to
argue about Establishment Clause issues in isolation from the remainder of
constitutional law. Adaptation of the sequenced, tiered-scrutiny approach that
has worked well elsewhere could produce significant, rationalizing
improvements in Establishment Clause doctrine. At the same time, reformist
impulses within the domain of the Establishment Clause should often yield to
transdoctrinal principles of judicial caution and restraint.
IV. STANDING TO SUE TO ENFORCE THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
This Part examines, and proposes frameworks for resolving, currently
controverted issues involving standing to enforce the Establishment Clause. A
central, organizing insight involves the conceptual connection between the rights
or interests that the Establishment Clause substantively protects and the interests
any infringement of which should suffice to create standing. Accordingly, this
Part draws heavily on subsection II.A.2’s analysis of substantive rights.

290
291

See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
For an unusually thoughtful effort to distill and apply those principles, see Shapiro, supra
note 264.
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With the connection between substantive constitutional guarantees and
harms to cognizable interests in mind, we can distinguish three possible bases
for standing that subsequent Sections of this Part will discuss in turn:
(a) financial and material burdens of a kind that would support standing
under a variety of constitutional provisions besides the Establishment Clause;
(b) injury incurred in the capacity of a taxpayer whose tax dollars are used to
support religious institutions or activities; and (c) other harms suffered as a
result of symbolic governmental support for religion. The largest payoff from
looking simultaneously at standing and merits issues will come in the third,
most disputed category. But clarifying and occasionally surprising
implications will emerge in the other categories as well.
In all cases, it will prove illuminating to compare the Supreme Court’s
standing analyses, which are sometimes highly restrictive, with cases in which
the Court has assumed standing under the Establishment Clause without
comment and rendered decisions on the merits. In Arizona Christian School
Tuition Organization v. Winn, a narrow majority of the Justices brushed aside
previous cases that had assumed the existence of standing as lacking
constitutional consequence.292 A more fruitful approach would look back at
cases decided on the merits with the aim of inferring the Court’s implicit prior
standards for recognizing standing. If we can identify the implicit theories that
would be both necessary and sufficient to support standing, we can then ask
whether those theories stand up to critical scrutiny. If so, we should hold the
Court to the bases for standing that it has implicitly embraced in the past.
A. Financial and Material Burdens Adequate for Standing Outside the
Establishment Clause
Most cases involving governmentally mandated religious accommodations
present no distinctive standing issues. When a defendant refuses to afford an
accommodation and the plaintiff is a person denied a claimed entitlement, the
injury is plain.293 By any account, denial of an exemption imposes costs.
When a plaintiff brings suit to enforce a statutory mandate, the defendant
will also have unquestionable standing to challenge the mandate as
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.294 Or, without waiting to
be sued, an institution that is subject to a statutory duty to accommodate will

292 563 U.S. 125, 144-45 (2011) (“When a potential jurisdictional defect is neither noted nor discussed
in a federal decision, the decision does not stand for the proposition that no defect existed.”).
293 See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005) (emphasizing that a facial challenge
was raised by prisoners who claimed they were denied religious accommodations).
294 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 45, at 167-68 & n.7.
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face a threat of financial or other loss if forced to comply and will thus have
standing to bring an anticipatory challenge.295
In yet another set of unproblematic cases, mandates to provide
accommodations to some religious believers or religious conduct may impose
corresponding burdens on those who receive no exemptions. For example, if
Congress enacted draft exemptions for religious believers, then non-exempted
individuals should be able to sue if their likelihood of being drafted increased
as a result. Indeed, because draft exemptions would require religiously-based
classifications, those who are assigned to a disadvantaged category as a result of
their religious views could claim an analogy to white plaintiffs in affirmative
action cases. In that context, “[t]he ‘injury in fact’ . . . is the denial of equal
treatment resulting from the imposition of [a] barrier, not the ultimate inability
to obtain the benefit.”296 Analogously, draft-eligible citizens might complain of
the imposition of a religion-based barrier to their escaping conscription.
A fraught set of standing issues has arisen when statutes mandating
religious accommodations for religiously motivated individuals result in
harms to third parties who are not themselves classified on the basis of
religion—for example, women who lose access to health benefits under the
ACA as a result of exemptions from ACA mandates for religiously motivated
employers. Some have argued that parties disadvantaged in this way have no
standing to complain of “burdens” because they have no “right” to health care
or contraceptive coverage except on such terms as the government may
choose.297 This argument fails. When women receive no contraceptive
coverage as a result of religious exemptions, the structure of their complaints
precisely tracks the legal analysis in Amos. In Amos, the plaintiff was allowed
to argue that a statutory exemption from an antidiscrimination mandate
violated the Establishment Clause due to the burden that it imposed on
third-party interests.298 Although the plaintiff lost on the merits, no member
of the Supreme Court doubted his entitlement to mount an Establishment
Clause challenge when Congress stripped him of a statutory right that he
295 The availability of antisuit injunctions to assert and protect constitutional rights is often
associated with the Supreme Court’s decision in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). For discussion
of Young and relevant surrounding history, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 45, at 927-35.
296 Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508
U.S. 656, 666 (1993).
297 See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, When Religious Exemptions Cause Third-Party Harms: Is the
Establishment Clause Violated?, 58 J. CHURCH & STATE 1, 15 (2016) (“If we are to assume a world
where the default position is comprehensive healthcare coverage, then it is a mere tautology that
departure from that baseline because of a RFRA accommodation for Hobby Lobby Stores and
Conestoga Wood Specialties is a loss or ‘burden’ for their employees . . . .”).
298 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327, 333 (1987) (arguing the exemption “burdens the free exercise rights of employees of
religious institutions who work in nonreligious jobs”).
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otherwise would have had. Women who lose valuable health benefits as a
result of RFRA-mandated exceptions to rights under the ACA should be able
to sue on the same basis, even if they should not always win.
B. Taxpayer Standing
Taxpayer standing presents distinctive issues. In an influential dissenting
opinion in Flast, Justice Harlan mocked the majority’s double-nexus test as
“entirely unrelated” to the purportedly controlling issue of whether the
plaintiff had a sufficient personal stake to justify standing.299 But taxpayer
challengers to expenditures to support religious institutions have no less a
personal stake than individual voters in one-person, one-vote cases or the
males in Heckler v. Mathews who could realize no financial gain from a ruling
in their favor.300 Moreover, taxpayer standing to enforce the Establishment
Clause, which has existed since Flast, possesses an inherent doctrinal logic
that taxpayer standing to enforce limits on Congress’s Spending Power under
Article I301—or even the Free Speech or the Equal Protection Clause—would
not: the Establishment Clause was distinctively intended to protect against
taxation in support of religion.
Imagine a case involving governmental financial support exclusively for
religious education. Or imagine that Congress levied a specific tax for support
of a newly designated National Church. Would the conservative Justices who
have expressed skepticism of taxpayer standing say that no one had standing
to challenge the appropriation? If they would allow other churches or
institutions to sue, perhaps the denial of taxpayer standing would occasion no
grave harm. It is far from clear, however, what harm a competitor church
would suffer302—unless stigmatic harm that one would expect the
conservatives to view with independent skepticism. In any event, if we think
about fitting plaintiffs in light of the purposes of the Establishment Clause,
the most appropriate would be the taxpayers whose money was extracted to
support an Establishment of Religion.303 Mitchell and Zelman implicitly
299
300
301

See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 122 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 182–88 and accompanying text.
See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 479-80 (1923) (holding a taxpayer suit challenging
congressional spending as unconstitutional under Article I and the Tenth Amendment to be
nonjusticiable).
302 See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 45, at 145 (“The traditional rule was that the
proprietor of a business lacks standing to object to the government’s support of competing activities,
because the common law does not recognize an interest in freedom from competition.”).
303 Cf. Richard M. Re, Relative Standing, 102 GEO. L.J. 1191, 1197 (2014) (arguing that the
Supreme Court’s standing cases are best understood as upholding standing by “those claimants with
the greatest stake in obtaining legal relief in any particular case” and as denying standing to those
with lesser stakes). But see Garnett, supra note 36, at 664 (arguing that “[t]he claim that the no-
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recognize as much. Against the background of the Court’s having rendered
merits rulings in those cases, it would be deeply incongruous not to have
taxpayer standing in cases involving public financial support for religious
activities and institutions.
If this analysis holds water, then the Court’s taxpayer standing decisions
in Valley Forge, Hein, and Winn warrant reappraisal in light of the substantive
merits of the claims that the challengers presented. When thus
reconsidered, the result in Hein—sculpting executive action out of the Flast
rule—emerges as indefensible. Flast might appear on the surface to be
distinguishable because Hein involved executive, not congressional,
action,304 and because the language of the Establishment Clause refers only
to Congress, not the President.305 But if we take a wide-angle look at the
parallel areas of Free Exercise and Free Speech Clause jurisprudence, we
see that the Court has treated all three branches of government as capable
of violating the First Amendment.306 The premises of its decisions imply
that executive provision of financial and related benefits to religious
institutions could also violate the Establishment Clause.
The Court’s reasoning in Valley Forge looks similarly misguided. If the
federal government cannot tax and spend directly to support religion
without violating the Establishment Clause, then it ought not be able to
tax, use the tax proceeds to acquire property, and then transfer the acquired
property to religious institutions. The protective purposes of the
Establishment Clause should extend as much to the latter case as to the
former. As I have argued, moreover, the same protective purposes that
would forbid a transfer of property as a matter of substantive constitutional
law should ground a claim of taxpayer standing.

establishment rule protects the liberty of conscience by regulating the disbursement of public funds
is . . . mistaken” and that standing rules predicated on this claim are therefore also unpersuasive).
304 See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 605 (2007) (“[T]he expenditures
at issue here were not made pursuant to any Act of Congress. Rather, Congress provided general
appropriations to the Executive Branch to fund its day-to-day activities.”).
305 See U.S. C ONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion”).
306 See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 441-42, 451 (1988)
(subjecting the conduct of the U.S. Forest Service to scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407-09 (1963) (reviewing the denial of unemployment
compensation by a state employment security commission for consistency with the First and
Fourteenth Amendments); see also Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 420 (1971)
(invalidating a prior restraint issued by an Illinois state court); Carroll v. President & Comm’rs,
393 U.S. 175, 185 (1968) (invalidating a prior restraint ordered by a state court). For further
discussion of the Supreme Court’s application of the First Amendment to branches other than
Congress, see Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text,
64 D UKE L.J. 1213, 1243-46 (2015); David A. Strauss, Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?,
129 HARV. L. REV. 1, 30-34 (2015).
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A similarly functional analysis would point to the conclusion that Winn,
too, was wrongly decided. The Court should have decided the case on the
merits. In a merits ruling, the Court could plausibly have held that a scheme
of tax credits for donations to both religious and nonreligious tuition
assistance organizations was substantially related to an important
governmental interest in promoting educational diversity. But the wedge that
the majority drove between constitutional rights under the Establishment
Clause and standing to enforce those rights was regrettable. In Justice Kagan’s
terms, the Court “offer[ed] a roadmap . . . to any government that wishes to
insulate its financing of religious activity from legal challenge.”307 She
elaborated: “Structure the funding as a tax expenditure . . . . No taxpayer will
have standing to object. However blatantly the government may violate the
Establishment Clause, taxpayers cannot gain access to the federal courts.”308 No
sound approach to the interpretation of rights-conferring constitutional
provisions such as the Establishment Clause would countenance this anomaly.309
C. Injury Resulting from Symbolic Support
As we begin to reappraise standing to challenge symbolic governmental
support for religion, it bears noting once more that in almost none of the
central cases decided to date—including crèche and Ten Commandments
cases—has the Supreme Court paused over standing issues.310 Its failure to
do so has perplexed the lower courts, which have had to guess at the basis on
which the Justices thought they could reach the merits.311 Some of the cases
may have involved taxpayer standing, even though the Court did not say so.312

307
308

Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 168 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. Justice Kennedy’s Court opinion noted the abstract possibility that some tax credits
might directly disadvantage “a particular religious group,” whose members then could sue to allege
constitutional violation, id. at 145 (majority opinion). But he appeared also to contemplate that no
one might have standing in the aftermath of Winn to challenge some schemes that at least one earlier
Court opinion, in Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973),
would mark as unconstitutional. See id. at 144.
309 Although there may frequently not be a constitutional right to pre-enforcement injunctive
remedies when other remedies are available to the victim of a constitutional rights violation, the
non-availability of any remedy whatsoever would be distinctively anomalous and problematic in any
case not presenting an otherwise non-justiciable political question. On the importance of the
distinction between non-availability of particular remedies and the denial of any remedy for a
constitutional violation whatsoever, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 45, at 328-35.
310 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
311 See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 42.
312 See id. at 1081 (observing that of the Supreme Court’s “four religious display cases from the
past three decades,” in all but Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005), “the lower court opinions
either expressly found municipal taxpayer standing or did not address standing but plausibly can be
read as predicating standing on the plaintiffs’ municipal taxpayer status”).
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But it seems unlikely that they all did. If not, we confront the puzzle of how
standing to challenge symbolic support for religion might be rationalized.
In Allen v. Wright,313 which involved an alleged failure by federal officials
to deny tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools, the
Supreme Court held that an allegation of stigmatization did not suffice for
standing. With specific reference to the Establishment Clause, the Court said
in Valley Forge that “the psychological consequence presumably produced by
observation of conduct with which one disagrees . . . is not an injury sufficient
to confer standing under Art. III, even though the disagreement is phrased
in constitutional terms.”314 In gauging standing to enforce the Establishment
Clause, however, we need to think once more about what the Clause protects
against. For this purpose, the example of sustained one-sect proselytization
that the conservative Justices said in County of Allegheny would violate the
Establishment Clause—epitomized by a large Latin cross affixed to city
hall—will serve amply.315 What harm would it visit upon whom?
As Part III’s merits analysis may have intimated, the best answer emerges
from the objective observer test that Justice O’Connor introduced as a
substantive measure of constitutional impermissibility in Lynch v. Donnelly.
Under that test, the court asks whether an objective observer would
understand a religious symbol as “send[ing] a message to nonadherents [of a
favored creed] that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community,”316 and as “making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to
a person’s standing in the political community.”317 Adapting that test, I would
find standing to object to symbolic support when a reasonable observer would
conclude that a governmental action or display sends a message that marks
nonadherents to the favored religion as less than fully valued members of the
community that they inhabit.318 In order to claim standing on this basis, a
plaintiff should need to allege that she is a member of the stigmatized or
marginalized group and that her ordinary course of life—not action taken

313
314

468 U.S. 737, 755-56 (1984).
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 485-86 (1982).
315 See County. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
316 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
317 Id. at 687-88.
318 See Steven D. Smith, Nonestablishment, Standing, and the Soft Constitution, 85 S T. JOHN’S
L. REV. 407, 439-40 (2011) (“When . . . the Supreme Court began to regard governmental
endorsement of religion as a violation of the Establishment Clause . . . it came to be supposed
that the offense suffered by observers was sufficient to confer standing.”); see also Lupu &
Tuttle, supra note 36, at 135 & n.99 (equating a standing injury of “religious alienation” with
“Justice O’Connor’s ‘no endorsement’ theory”).
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solely to create standing to bring a lawsuit—brings her or will bring her into
contact with the challenged activity or display.319
As Part III emphasized, the objective observer test admittedly requires
judgment in administration. As a test for standing, however, the objective
observer formula is not significantly more open-textured than other
standing tests that depend on the identification of noneconomic injury. In
the case of symbolic speech of the kind involved in displays of crèches and
the Ten Commandments, there is a powerful, broadly shared constitutional
intuition that some challengers come sufficiently within the zone of
interests that the Establishment Clause protects to deserve a ruling on the
merits of their claims, presumably because they suffer a harm of some kind.
All of the Justices appear to have credited this intuition in reaching the
merits in the Court’s leading cases.
Alternative efforts to explain standing in cases involving crèches or Ten
Commandments displays—or, one should bear in mind, in a case involving
the erection of a large Latin cross atop a city hall—are all less convincing.
We should agree that mere feelings of offense do not furnish a plausible
basis for standing. Some more objective measure seems necessary.320 Mere
unwanted exposure to religious images or expression should not suffice
unless a further, more objective test is satisfied.321 Sometimes the harm
issuing from unwanted exposure to symbolic support for religion should not
rise to the level of judicial cognizability—as in the case of “In God We
Trust” on the currency. Nor does it make sense to uphold standing based
on the costs that particular challengers may incur in order to avoid exposure
to displays that they do not want to see.322 This approach would allow
anyone to manufacture standing through the expedient of making a few
even slightly costly detours (or by making all purchases with checks or
credit cards in order not to encounter “In God We Trust”).

319 Under this standard, many if not most residents of Allegheny County would have had
standing to challenge the crèche and menorah displays in County. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573, 578.
Similarly, a lawyer who regularly used the law library in the Texas State Capitol would have had
standing to challenge the Ten Commandments display in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 682
(2005). But a Massachusetts resident who happened to hear of the exhibits would not have standing
absent further facts that I have not stipulated. The question of exactly who would have standing to
challenge the erection of a memorial cross at a national monument might be a more difficult one,
but a regular visitor ought to qualify. Cf. Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 711 (2010) (upholding the
standing of a former National Park Service employee to object to a display on federal land but
dividing about the grounds for standing).
320 See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 42, at 1083 (critically discussing this asserted basis for standing).
321 See id. at 1090-91 (“[I]nvoluntary exposure requirements do nothing to redeem a naked
‘direct personal contact’ test from its absolute incompatibility with the Supreme Court’s standing
precedents because they do not alter the nature of the alleged harm.”).
322 See id. at 1091-92 (noting the limits of such an approach).
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A final alternative would be to hold that no one has standing in symbolic
speech cases in the absence of either coercion or taxpayer standing.323 But this
approach should satisfy no one. It would put some actual or imaginable cases
of what nearly everyone—liberal and conservative alike—would regard as
plain violations of a rights-conferring provision of the Constitution beyond
the jurisdiction of the federal courts to rectify.
The same analysis largely holds in cases involving religion in the public
schools. If the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from using its
role in furnishing public education to endorse religious dogma, and creates
rights against endorsement, then the harms occasioned by coerced exposure
to unwanted proselytization should suffice to support standing.
CONCLUSION
When compared with other constitutional doctrines, Establishment
Clause doctrine is an outlier with respect both to the merits and to standing.
Although the Supreme Court should maintain the outlines of the largely
category-based approach that currently prevails in Establishment Clause
litigation, the Justices could, and should, clarify a number of issues and
resolve some persistent confusions by pulling Establishment Clause doctrine
more nearly into the constitutional mainstream. In particular, the Court
should adopt a regime of sequenced, tiered merits analysis and, regardless of
category, should apply elevated scrutiny to statutes that impinge on interests
that the Establishment Clause protects. Within such a regime, the Court
should apply strict scrutiny to any statute that classifies or requires
classifications based on religion. It should prescribe intermediate scrutiny for
statutes that expend tax revenues to provide material benefits to churches or
religiously affiliated organizations on a nondiscriminatory, nonpreferential
basis. And it should clarify its approach to determining which symbolic
supports for religion rise to the level of Establishment Clause violations, even
when honesty requires acknowledging that promoting religion is their
predominant purpose. Correspondingly, the Court should realign standing
doctrine to equate the injuries needed for standing more closely with those
against which the Establishment Clause furnishes substantive protection.

323 For a defense of this approach, rooted both in concerns about the separation of powers and
in prudential interests in avoiding judicial involvement in “the culture wars,” see id. at 1092-97. Both
lines of argument rely on without expressly defending the premise—which I have argued is
mistaken—that the Establishment Clause confers few if any individual rights in cases not involving
coercion.
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